


**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control



19980113 200

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-92-034

CONTENTS

27 November 1992

CHINA

PRC Envoy's Statement to UN Disarmament Committee [Hou Zhitong; BEIJING REVIEW 9-16 Nov]	1
Measures Against Space Arms Race Proposed at UN [XINHUA 10 Nov]	3
Envoy to UN Praises Draft Chemical Warfare Convention [XINHUA 12 Nov]	3
Response to French Nuclear Test Ban Proposal [XINHUA 12 Nov]	3

EAST ASIA

CAMBODIA

SRV Reportedly Plans To Use Toxic Chemicals [Radio VGNUFC 15 Nov]	4
---	---

JAPAN

Russian Cosmonaut Urges Space-Based Nuclear Arms Monitoring [KYODO 16 Nov]	4
--	---

NORTH KOREA

ROK Charge of Chemical Weapons Use Condemned [Pyongyang Radio 14 Nov]	4
---	---

LATIN AMERICA

CUBA

Cuba To Sign Convention Banning Chemical Weapons [Havana Radio 11 Nov]	6
--	---

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Sino-Indian Talks on Confidence-Building Measures [INDIAN EXPRESS 4 Nov]	7
French Proposal on Nuclear Test Ban Viewed [R. Singh; Delhi International 11 Nov]	7

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister: Israel To Sign CW Convention [Jerusalem Radio 17 Nov]	8
---	---

PAKISTAN

UN Adopts South Asia NFZ Proposal [Islamabad Radio 13 Nov]	8
--	---

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

GENERAL

Kurchatov Aide Reminisces on Nuclear Arms Program [I. Golovin; POISK 12-18 Sep]	9
Mikhaylov Comments On Nuclear Weapons Museum [ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 20 Oct]	11
Defense Ministry Treaty Directorate Chief Interviewed [D. Kharchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Nov]	12
Commentary Advocates Regional Conference on Asian Nuclear Policy [A. Kondratyev; Moscow International 7 Nov]	14
Yeltsin Addresses British Parliament in London [Russian TV 10 Nov]	14

Shumeyko Says Military Spending One-Eighth of USSR's Expenses [INTERFAX 10 Nov]	16
Kozyakov Comments on Proposed U.S. Arms Reductions [Moscow International 13 Nov]	16

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Russian Decree on Utilization of Eliminated Missile Complexes	16
Army To Get New Housing [O. Falichev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Nov]	16
Decree Provisions Summarized [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 11 Nov]	17
Ukrainian Premier: Western Attitude Threatens START Ratification [Paris LE MONDE 7 Nov]	18
Yeltsin Comments on Progress of Missile Elimination [ITAR-TASS 10 Nov]	18
Ukraine Seeks 'Compensation' for START Ratification [L. Kravchuk; Kiev International 11 Nov]	19
Kokoshin Views Missile Forces Future on Visit to Rezhitsa Base	20
Sees 'Great Solution' [INTERFAX 12 Nov]	20
Seeks To 'Define Nuances' [Moscow TV 12 Nov]	20
'Important Decisions,' Further Reductions Foreseen [IZVESTIYA 13 Nov]	20
'Nuclear Shield' To Remain [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Nov]	21
Bush Visit Canceled; START Treaty Not Ready [IZVESTIYA 12 Nov]	22

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Cheap Sale of Laser Technology to West Hit [R. Sergaziyeva; ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 11 Nov]	22
---	----

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Belarus Ratifies CFE Treaty	23
Text of Ratification Decree [NARODNAYA GAZETA 28 Oct]	23
Report on Reduction Plans [V. Kovalev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Nov]	24
Reports, Comments on Russian Withdrawal From Baltics	25
Russian Officer, Latvian Official on Pullout Halt [F. Melnichuk, G. Stiprais; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 4 Nov]	25
Latvian Chairman on Yeltsin Letter [Riga Radio 6 Nov]	27
Baltic Council Urges Unconditional Pullout [INTERFAX 6 Nov]	27
Baltic Leaders Back Talks [ETA NEWS BULLETIN 9 Nov]	27
Lithuanian Charge in Moscow Comments [BALTFAX 10 Nov]	27
Russia's Churkin, Air Defense General Comment [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 10 Nov]	28
Decision on Funding Troops in Estonia, Latvia [Moscow TV 11 Nov]	28
Russia Creates Troop Withdrawal Commission [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Nov]	28
Russian NWGF Deputy Commander Interviewed [F. Melnichuk; KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 11 Nov]	29
Russia's Shumeyko Links Baltics, NATO Withdrawals [BALTFAX 18 Nov]	29
Progress of Russian-Lithuanian Ships for Housing Deal Viewed [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Nov]	30
Russian Deputy Defense Minister on Troop Withdrawals [B. Gromov; Moscow International 11 Nov]	30
Russian Defense Aides on Reform Measures, Reduction in Force [ITAR-TASS 17 Nov]	31

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakh Ecology Ministry Details Secret Nuclear Tests [IZVESTIYA 29 Oct]	32
---	----

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Udmurt Concerns Over CW Destruction Plant Viewed [V. Litovkin; NEDELYA Sep]	32
Further on Mirzayanov CW Secrecy Case	34
Military Blamed for Arrest [V. Loshak; MOSCOW NEWS 1-8 Nov]	34
Legal Basis of Charges Queried [N. Gevorkyan; MOSCOW NEWS 1-8 Nov]	34
Bio Information on Mirzayanov, Fedorov [MOSCOW NEWS 1-8 Nov]	35
Mirzayanov on Imprisonment, Charges [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 3 Nov]	35
Russia Said To Violate CW Commitments [A. Pushkov; MOSCOW NEWS 1-8 Nov]	36
Officials Offer Justification for Mirzayanov Prosecution	36

Political Persecution, Treaty Violations Denied [A. Gorbovskiy, A. Kondaurav; Moscow TV 5 Nov]	36
Legal Errors, Ongoing CW Development Admitted [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 6 Nov]	38

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Shaposhnikov on Problem of Ownership of Strategic Forces [ITAR-TASS 4 Nov]	38
Ukrainian Parliament's Stance on Nuclear Arms Viewed [V. Lartsev, V. Ruban; MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 10 Nov]	38
Parliament Speaker: No Nuclear Weapons in Azerbaijan [TURAN 10 Nov]	39
Shaposhnikov Wants Russia-Ukraine Nuclear Summit [INTERFAX 12 Nov]	39
Kravchuk Reiterates Nuclear Arms Position in Talk With Clinton [ITAR-TASS 12 Nov]	40
Ukrainian Aide: No Knowledge of Independent Nuclear Arms Codes [Kiev International 13 Nov]	40
Kazakhstan Official Affirms Adherence to Nuclear Treaties [ITAR-TASS 16 Nov]	40
NATO Commander Visits Ukraine, Discusses Nuclear Disarmament	40
Kravchuk Seeks Security Guarantee [Kiev TV 16 Nov]	40
Nuclear Weapons Not for Sale [ITAR-TASS 17 Nov]	40
Minister Qualifies Disarmament Stance [INTERFAX 18 Nov]	41
Shaposhnikov Views CIS Security 'Blueprint,' Nuclear Issues [IZVESTIYA 17 Nov]	41

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Nuclear Test Moratorium May Be Extended [Paris Radio 3 Nov]	43
Plan To Extend Nuclear Test Moratorium Viewed [LE MONDE 6 Nov]	43
France To Help Dismantle Russian Nuclear Arms	43
Agreement To Be Signed 12 Nov [AFP 11 Nov]	43
Kozyrev Arrives in Paris [AFP 12 Nov]	44

UNITED KINGDOM

Major Endorses Universal Nuclear Test Ban [IZVESTIYA 7 Nov]	44
Defense Secretary To Rebuff Russian Call for Nuclear Arms Cuts [THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 7 Nov]	45

PRC Envoy's Statement to UN Disarmament Committee

OW1711112592 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 45, 9-16 Nov 92 pp 9-11

[Statement by Ambassador to the United Nations Hou Zhitong at the First Committee of the 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly on 21 October]

[Text] Since the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, major events have occurred one after another in international relations and the world situation has undergone profound changes. The international community has finally rid itself of the old world pattern characterized by the confrontation between the East and West military blocs. The world, developing in the direction of multipolarity, has embarked on a new historical phase. Peace and development are still the present-day world's two main subjects.

However, world peace and tranquility, which the international community avidly longed for, have not automatically descended in the wake of the demise of the "cold war." Owing to serious imbalance of power in the world, contradictions concealed in the past have intensified, and the North-South disparities become more prominent. In addition, old and new contentions and disputes interweave with one another. All these make the world more turbulent and volatile, and have even given rise to fierce armed conflicts. The existence of hegemonism and power politics is still the principal obstacle to resolving the questions of peace, security and development.

Faced with a complicated and turbulent international situation, the people of the world even more urgently demand the dismantling of the old unequal international order and more strongly call for the establishment of a new international order. A peaceful, stable, just and rational new international order, including an equal and mutually beneficial new international economic order, "should be built upon the principles of mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Only in this way can countries in the world pursue common development in an international environment of enduring peace and security. We firmly believe that as the world develops in the direction of multipolarity, such a new international order will ultimately be established.

With the changes in the world structure, same progress has been made in the field of arms control and disarmament. The United States and the Russian Federation have ratified their START treaty and reached understanding on further reducing their strategic nuclear arsenals. Not long ago, the United States announced that it would withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from overseas, and the CFE agreement began to be implemented. The international community welcomes these positive developments and hopes that the parties concerned will faithfully implement the agreements and understanding they have reached. In the meantime, people have also realized that there is still a long way to go in disarmament, and even after the above steps of arms reduction are completed, the reality will remain unchanged that the two military powers possess the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenals, sophisticated

weaponry and the capability for developing space weapons. Therefore, they still have special responsibility for disarmament. The international community urges them to further drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals, destroy the nuclear warheads that are cut, halt the upgrading, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and stop developing space weapons.

Complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is what the Chinese Government has consistently stood for, and the urgent aspiration and fundamental objective of the international community as well. In order to achieve this ultimate goal, at present it is necessary to take some transitional measures. In this regard, China is ready to put forward the following proposals:

1. All nuclear-weapon states follow China's lead in making the commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. An international agreement should be reached in this regard.
2. All other nuclear-weapon states support, as China has done, the proposal for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones, and undertake corresponding obligations. We also urge the countries that have deployed nuclear weapons abroad to withdraw all these weapons back immediately.
3. All the countries that have space capabilities should observe the principle of peaceful use of outer space, immediately stop the research, test, production and deployment of space weapons and not introduce weapon systems into outer space.

As a nuclear-weapon state, China has unilaterally and unconditionally assumed corresponding obligations in these important areas and made its own contributions. We hope that the other nuclear-weapon states will do likewise.

Proceeding from its principled position for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the Chinese government has consistently supported and participated in the international community's efforts for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Out of its support for the purposes and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] and taking into consideration the aspirations of non-nuclear-weapon states, China officially acceded to the treaty last March.

NPT is one of the most universally accepted international instruments in the field of arms control. Although not free from defects and inadequacies, it plays a positive role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A conference of the parties to the treaty will be held in 1995. We are ready to take part in the work of its preparatory committee with a constructive attitude.

We believe that in order to increase the universality of NPT and strike a balance between the rights and obligations of its states parties, it would be utmost important for the major nuclear-weapon powers to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament and abandon the policy of nuclear deterrence, for all nuclear weapon states to provide security assurances to non-nuclear states and unconditionally undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear

weapons, for nuclear industry capable states to actively promote international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in benefit of the economic and social development of various countries, especially developing countries, and for the international non-proliferation regime to be strengthened with the full participation of non-nuclear-weapon states.

China always supports the demands for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace made by relevant countries in various regions on the basis of voluntary consultations. In the meantime, we have all along advocated that the nuclear weapon states should respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and assume corresponding obligations. This is an effective measure conducive to various regions' security and stability and to the promotion of nuclear disarmament. On the basis of this principled position, China has signed and ratified the relevant additional protocols to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America all and the Caribbean and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and we support the proposals for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Here I wish to state that the Chinese government supports the efforts of the special conference held recently by the states parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco for improving the treaty's universality and effectiveness and reaffirms the obligations China has undertaken in relation to the treaty. Meanwhile we appreciate the recent ratification by France of the additional protocol 1 to the treaty.

After many years of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, an international convention has finally been concluded on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, thereby laying down an international legal basis for eliminating globally this entire category of weapons of mass destruction. As a non-chemical-weapon state which was deeply victimized by foreign chemical weapons in its history, China has consistently stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and the production facilities thereof. By attaching great importance to and taking an active part in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention we have made our own contributions. Although the present draft convention still suffers from certain defects, inadequacies and imbalanced contents, we believe that its purposes and objectives, namely the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons, should enjoy broad approval and support of the international community. Therefore, China joined the consensus on the draft convention at The Conference on Disarmament and agreed that the draft convention be submitted to the current session of the General Assembly for deliberation. In the meantime, in its statement of positions, China also expressed its concerns and reservations over the defects of the draft convention, as well as its hope that these defects will be resolved appropriately. In view of China, complete achievement of the basic objectives of the draft convention and the realization of a chemical-weapon-free world will undoubtedly be of positive significance to maintaining international peace and security.

Disarmament and arms control directly concern every country's rights and interests as well as international peace

and security. Therefore, the countries in the world, big or small, strong or weak, all have the right to participate on an equal footing in the discussions and settlement of such issues, rather than let them be monopolized or manipulated by a few big powers. In order to enhance international peace and security and to promote disarmament process, hegemonism and power politics must be completely removed from international relations and all states should strictly observe the UN Charter and other norms of international relations, so as to ensure full respect of every country's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and security.

We oppose the attempt of a country to interfere in and obstruct normal cooperation between sovereign states under the pretext of preventing arms proliferation. We strongly reject the blatant violation of the UN Charter, other norms of international relations and even one's own commitment to international agreement by grossly interfering through arms transfer in another country's internal affairs. Such practice of double standards and breach of faith in the field of arms control is both typical of hegemonism and power politics, and detrimental to international peace, security and stability.

The Asian and Pacific region is relatively stable in the political aspect and undergoing sustained economic development. As an Asia-Pacific country, China attaches great importance to maintaining security and stability in the region and to developing friendly relations with its neighbouring countries. To these ends we have made unremitting efforts. China has consistently pursued an independent foreign policy of peace, with safeguarding national independence and sovereignty and promoting world peace and development as its basic objectives. China does not seek hegemony or any sphere of influence, nor establish military bases abroad. Neither do we station a single soldier overseas, or pose a threat to any other country. China is a firm force for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.

With a view to promoting in an all-round way disarmament and security in the Asia-Pacific region, China is of the view that:

1. In developing relations with one another, Asia-Pacific countries should strictly abide by the United Nations Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respect each other, treat each other with sincerity, cooperate with each other on an equal footing and live in amity.
2. None of the Asia-Pacific countries should seek regional or sub-regional hegemony or establish sphere of influence, set up or participate in a military bloc directed against other countries, build military bases on foreign soil or station its troops abroad. Nor should it infringe upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries under whatever pretext.
3. All of the Asia-Pacific countries should commit themselves to developing good-neighbourly and friendly relations. They should settle territorial and border disputes as well as other problems left over from history through peaceful consultations instead of resorting to force or threat of force. In this regard, peaceful negotiations may be conducted when conditions are ripe; otherwise, a dispute or problem may be shelved until conditions are ripe.

4. None of the Asia-Pacific countries should engage in any form of arms races. The defence capabilities of each country should be kept at a level commensurate with its legitimate defence needs.

In our view, in order to promote peace, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, efforts should be made first of all at the, bilateral level to promote dialogue and take action so as to increase trust, reduce tension, settle dispute and enhance security, thus leading, step by step, to the establishment and development of a suitable mechanism of dialogue for regional and subregional security. We are willing to work together with the relevant countries to further improve the environment of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The task facing the First Committee of the current session of the UN General Assembly is both important and arduous. Here, I would like to assure that the Chinese delegation, with a positive and constructive attitude, will closely cooperate with other delegations in the consideration of our agenda items and make its own contribution to the success of the work of the First Committee and to further progress in the field of security and disarmament.

Measures Against Space Arms Race Proposed at UN

OW1011222892 Beijing XINHUA in English 2213 GMT 10 Nov 92

[Text] United Nations, November 10 (XINHUA)—China calls on the international community to take necessary measures to prevent the arms race in outer space.

Proposed today at the first committee of the U.N. by Chinese diplomat Wu Chengjiang, these measures include comprehensive prohibition of all types of outer space weapons and prohibition of the use of force or acts of hostility in, from or toward outer space.

Over the years, Wu pointed out, no substantive negotiations have been conducted on "prevention of an arms race in outer space" in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament while at the same time some countries have been researching and developing outer space weapons.

Outer space belongs to entire mankind and should be used for peaceful purposes and for the good of humanity, he continued.

"China stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of outer space weapons, and advocate that countries with space capabilities should take measures to prevent and stop the arms race in outer space, with the comprehensive prohibition of outer space weapons as the highest priority," he said.

"Countries that have the largest space capabilities should by all means bear special responsibilities. It is imperative for them to stop immediately the development, test, production and deployment of outer space weapons and destroy all the existing ones," he added.

On the basis of the above principled position, he said, China has joined in the co-sponsorship of a draft resolution calling for all states, space countries in particular, to contribute to the realization of prevention an arms race in outer space.

Envoy to UN Praises Draft Chemical Warfare Convention

OW1211223292 Beijing XINHUA in English 2215 GMT 12 Nov 92

[Text] United Nations, November 12 (XINHUA)—China says the draft convention on prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons (CW) will undoubtedly be conducive to maintaining world peace and security.

Reiterating China's position on the draft CW convention today at the first committee, Chinese Ambassador Hou Zhitong said the draft convention lays down an international legal basis for eliminating the entire category of CW weapons of mass destruction from the whole world.

Standing for the fundamentally correct purposes and objectives of prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, he continued, the draft enjoys broad approval and support from the international community.

"The full achievement of these purposes and objectives, leading to a chemical-weapon free world, will undoubtedly be conducive to maintaining international peace and security," he added.

Ambassador Hou said that China, as a non-CW state and a victim of the scourge of foreign chemical weapons, has consistently stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of such weapons and their production facilities, and has made contributions to the conclusion of the draft convention by taking an active part in the negotiations on the draft.

However, the ambassador pointed out, the draft convention contains some defects, lacks proper balance and not adequately reflects the just demands and reasonable propositions of numerous developing countries.

Therefore, like many other countries, China cannot help expressing its concern and reservation over such drawbacks of the draft convention, the ambassador said, hoping that these problems will be resolved constructively.

The draft convention was concluded by the conference of disarmament last September at Geneva after 20 years of negotiations.

Response to French Nuclear Test Ban Proposal

OW1211083792 Beijing XINHUA in English 0831 GMT 12 Nov 92

[Text] Beijing, November 12 (XINHUA)—A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman today responded to the French proposal for holding consultations among the five nuclear powers on halting nuclear test, saying China is willing to discuss relevant issues with the members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and within the framework of the conference.

"The Chinese Government has taken note of the French proposal," Spokesman Wu Jianmin said at a weekly press conference this afternoon in reply to a question from a reporter.

"The Chinese Government is willing to discuss relevant issues with all the members of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, including France, and within the existing framework of the conference," he said.

CAMBODIA

SRV Reportedly Plans To Use Toxic Chemicals

BK1611005692 (Clandestine) Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia in Cambodian 2330 GMT 15 Nov 92

[“Statement of the spokesman of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea concerning Vietnamese and their puppets planning to use toxic chemicals to kill Cambodian people in the current 1992-93 dry season” dated 14 November—read by announcer]

[Text] 1. The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea [NADK] has received a clear report from sources of the Phnom Penh army both in Phnom Penh itself and in Battambang and Siem Reap Provinces saying that the Yuon [Vietnamese] aggressors and their puppets have mapped out a plan to use toxic chemicals to kill NADK members and Cambodian people along the Thai border and on battlefields inside Cambodia. The Yuon aggressors and their puppets will begin using toxic chemicals on 25 November. Their aim is to eliminate the national forces, both soldiers and people, who are regarded as resistance forces against them.

2. Regarding this criminal plan, the NADK would like to inform the Supreme National Council [SNC] and UNTAC [UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia] beforehand so that they can carry out their duties as defined by the agreement.

3. The NADK would like to call on all NADK members and Cambodian people everywhere both in the rear and on the frontline to heighten their vigilance and take concrete measures so that they will always be ready to cope with any event either in the air, on land, and at sea, and be careful with food. It is imperative to prepare combat forces beforehand and get ready to smash this plan of the Yuon enemies and their puppets in the entire 15th dry season.

Dated 14 November 1992

[Signed] The spokesman of the NADK.

JAPAN

Russian Cosmonaut Urges Space-Based Nuclear Arms Monitoring

OW1611132592 Tokyo KYODO in English 1257 GMT 16 Nov 92

[Text] Tokyo, Nov. 16 KYODO—A veteran Russian cosmonaut called Monday for enhancing space-based monitoring of compliance by major military powers with strategic nuclear arms cutback treaties.

Vladimir Shatalov, head of Russia's Cosmonaut Training Center, made the proposal before a group of some 300 scientists and cosmonauts from 39 countries at the Asia-Pacific International Space Year Conference. Shatalov is a former pilot of the Soviet Union's Soyuz spacecraft, who oversaw the world's first successful spacecraft docking.

He said such space-based monitoring collaboration would also help uncover possible efforts by smaller nations to develop nuclear weapons.

Shatalov, mentor of Japan's first astronaut-cum-journalist Toyohiro Akiyama of the Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) who trained in his institute outside Moscow, said, “The destiny of mankind depends on their behavior.” Humanity should recognize the possible fate of the planet, saddled as it is with numerous nuclear missiles, he said.

He underscored the importance of space-based reconnaissance efforts in forcing countries with nuclear missiles to start talks on cutting back.

“Negotiations on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks were initiated only after negotiators (from the U.S. and Russia) notified other sides they have already detected the whereabouts of the other's nuclear arms sites,” he said. “Should such a multilateral monitoring mechanism be introduced, we would be able to observe military drills in border areas,” Shatalov said.

Later the same day, Jerome Apt, one of six American crew members of the Endeavour space shuttle who participated in a flight mission in September with Japanese astronaut Mamoru Mohri, told a press conference he has similar sentiments to Shatalov. Apt, a mission specialist at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), also said international cooperation and solidarity can be accomplished to promote space development despite intense business competition among aeronautics manufacturers. He said he expects a profiteering race could have the favorable effect of encouraging development of high-quality aeronautics products.

Mohri, the first Japanese scientist to be a member of a space shuttle laboratory research mission, said Japan should supply astronauts at least once every two years as “Japanese researchers have many good ideas and need to be aboard the space shuttle in order to verify them.”

NORTH KOREA

ROK Charge of Chemical Weapons Use Condemned

SK1511131092 Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network in Korean 0943 GMT 14 Nov 92

[Unattributed talk: “Premeditated Smear Campaign”]

[Text] The puppet South Korean Agency for National Security Planning [NSP] is running amok with a premeditated smear campaign to slander us.

In a report on the so-called actual conditions of biological and chemical weapons in North Korea issued some time ago in the National Assembly Defense Committee, the South Korean puppet NSP, a den of anticommunist strategy, lied that we produced and stockpiled a large quantity of chemical and biological weapons in a bid to strengthen military offensive capability against the South. This is an example of the smear campaign.

In an attempt to give credibility to its deceitful propaganda, the bunch of conspirators fabricated a false number of stockpiled biological and chemical weapons. It even described the albumin fertilizer plant in Suncheon vinalon complex, the Yongsong beer plant, and other chemical, food, and pharmaceutical plants as plants producing biological and chemical weapons.

The claim that we produce biological and chemical weapons and that we are preparing for chemical warfare is indeed a groundless and preposterous falsehood. This is a premeditated smear campaign prepared in a secret underground room of the puppet NSP, in accordance with the scenario designed to slander us.

The true aspects of this anti-Republic smear campaign, such as the incident of so-called Kim Nak-chung fixed spy ring and the incident of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] in South Korea, have been revealed, and false suspicion of our nuclear development has been exposed to the entire world. As the result, the smear campaign has become unconvincing. Accordingly, in a bid to shock public opinion, the South Korean rulers produced another slanderous drama depicting that we have produced a large quantity of biological and chemical weapons and that we are preparing for biological and chemical warfare.

Today the South Korean puppets are scheming to return the situation on the Korean peninsula, which is advancing toward reconciliation and detente after the adoption and effectuation of the North-South agreement, to distrust and confrontation through repeated smear campaigns.

The South Korean ruling bunch's smear campaign is also designed to turn public sentiment in the South that opposes the bunch in the face of the presidential election, toward anticommunism; to evade a serious political crisis by strengthening fascist oppression, and to prolong the military fascist regime.

This is not only the aim of the South Korean ruling bunch's smear campaign. This is also part of a reactionary propaganda offensive waged by the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets in collusion with each other in a bid to spoil the image of our Republic. This is a contemptible maneuver designed to justify preparations for the biological and chemical warfare that they are accelerating in South Korea and to justify the Team Spirit joint military exercise, which they decided to resume in the future.

Our Republic participated in the Geneva Accord in 1925, which bans the use of poisonous chemical weapons. Accordingly, the government of our Republic always respects all international agreements on this accord.

Our people, in particular, are the very victims who suffered miserable calamities due to chemical and bacteriological weapons used by the U.S. imperialists during the Korean war period. Therefore, we oppose biological and chemical weapons more firmly than anyone else.

In a statement of the Foreign Ministry on 26 January 1989, we put forward a proposal to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone and a zone free from chemical weapons.

Our initiative proved to be active efforts to remove the danger of nuclear war and chemical war on the Korean

peninsula and to ensure peace and security, thus gaining support from the peaceloving people of the world.

Biological and chemical warfare is being prepared in the South, not the North. The U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets long ago worked out an offensive strategy for air-ground warfare by using chemical and biological weapons as the basic striking means. They accelerated full scale preparations for chemical and nuclear warfare.

They dragged about ten poisonous gas plants into South Korea in 1984. During the U.S.-South Korea annual Security Consultative Meeting in May 1985, they conspired about South Korea maintaining independent chemical warfare capability, and they introduced a large quantity of ion chemical weapon—a new weapon of mass destruction—into South Korea.

There are more than 40 underground storehouses of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons in area around Mt. Kyeryong in South Chungchong Province and near Suwon in Kyonggi Province. A great number of ion chemical weapons are being stored there.

According to the material revealed by the U.S. imperialists themselves many years ago, as many as 25,000 drums of chemical weapons of 10-odd types, including poisonous gas, have been stockpiled in South Korea and the surrounding area.

For many years, the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean puppets systematically conducted training pertaining to chemical warfare at a school of the puppet navy's chemical, biological and radiological warfare unit and at the puppet army's combat infantry units and schools. In particular, whenever the Team Spirit joint military exercise was conducted, they expanded and strengthened the offensive war exercise based on biological and chemical weapons, as well as nuclear weapons.

All facts clearly prove that those who produce and stockpile biological and chemical weapons on the Korean peninsula and who are perpetrating the chemical warfare maneuvers are none other than the U.S. imperialists and the South Korean ruling bunch.

No matter how frantically the South Korean ruling bunch may adhere to its contemptible, deceitful, and slanderous campaign, it can never hide the truth nor can it achieve its ugly political aims. The South Korean ruling bunch should clearly keep this in mind.

The South Korean puppets should take steps to withdraw the U.S. nuclear weapons and biological and chemical weapons, which they dragged into South Korea, instead of adhering to a foolish scheme to slander us. They should immediately stop producing chemical weapons and their preparations for chemical warfare. They should step down from power without delay, according to the demand of the people.

CUBA**Cuba To Sign Convention Banning Chemical Weapons**

*PA1111042092 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish
0000 GMT 11 Nov 92*

[Text] The Cuban Foreign Ministry issued communique on 10 November stating the government's decision to sign the convention on the prohibition, development, production,

storage, use, and destruction of chemical weapons [CW]. The convention is being studied by the UN General Assembly.

In the communique, the Foreign Ministry stated that the decision was made after a careful analysis of the draft convention. It also referred to the island's firm stand in support of any disarmament measure that will lead to the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

The signing of the convention on the prohibition, development, production, storage, use, and destruction of chemical weapons will begin in January 1993.

INDIA

Sino-Indian Talks on Confidence-Building Measures

BK1211040492 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English
4 Nov 92 p 12

[Text] New Delhi—Significant confidence building measures [CBM] to maintain peace along the Sino-Indo border are on the anvil.

The recently concluded fifth meeting of the Sino-Indo Joint Working Group [JWG] in Beijing discussed in detail a series of CBMs including a reduction of troops, shifting of border posts to increase the distance between them, prior intimation of military exercises and the handling of air intrusions on either side.

While no formal agreement was reached on these in this round of discussions, the next JWG meeting is likely to finalise some of these to maintain the tempo of improving relations between India and China.

The only tangible outcome of the fifth round was the decision to open additional points for border trade. The location of these points are to be finalised through diplomatic channels. One is already in place along the Indo-Tibet border.

Foreign Office sources said the effort of the JWG at present is to take concrete steps along the Line of Actual Control and increase the level and frequency of contacts to create an atmosphere in which the main bone of contention between India and China—the sensitive border question—can be discussed.

The Chinese side is understood to have repeated its standard formulation on this ticklish issue by offering to make adjustments in the western sector in return for similar concession from India in the eastern sector.

This is put on paper by the Chinese at every JWG but without details to begin negotiations. The Indian side asked China for a specific offer to be considered by New Delhi.

There is a growing realisation on both sides of the need to build a political and public consensus on this issue before getting down to the nitty-gritty of resolving it. This feeling was reiterated not only by the Indian side in the recent discussions but significantly by the Chinese side as well.

In keeping with this the range of contacts between India and China has been stepped up considerably in the past year, starting with the Chinese Premier's visit last December. Since then, the former president, Mr. R. Venkataraman, and the Defence Minister, Mr. Sharad Pawar, have been to China which has sent in return a parliamentary delegation, a military delegation and other sundry officials to India.

At present, the Welfare Minister, Mr. Sitaram Kesri, is in China and the Human Resource Development Minister, Mr. Arjun Singh, is slated to leave within a couple of days for Beijing. From the Chinese side, visits by their President, their Party General Secretary and the Vice Speaker of their Parliament are on cards.

China watchers here point out that Beijing today is primarily concerned with its internal economic development and realises the importance of maintaining non-acrimonious, stable relations with its neighbours. It has recently stepped up contacts with the ASEAN countries and with Japan, the highlight of which was the first visit ever by a Japanese Emperor to Beijing last week. Its desire to buy peace with India should be seen in this context.

French Proposal on Nuclear Test Ban Viewed

BK1111123592 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas
Service in English 1010 GMT 11 Nov 92

[Commentary by Ravindrapal Singh of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis]

[Text] The French call to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to hold talks on ending nuclear weapons tests and controlling launches of ballistic missiles coincides with the arrival of a new administration in Washington. The United States under the Republican dispensation has been consistently opposing a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. The American objections were shaped mainly by the cold war experience. The controls on ballistic missile launches would be acceptable to the major powers in case of only two categories of these systems. One would be of the type of missile systems which have become operationally redundant and the second category of missiles are those which would not be technologically competitive.

Except for Chinese objections to controlling exports of ballistic missiles, who do not consider missiles as weapons of mass destruction, the other four countries have at stake controlling proliferation of ballistic missiles in the third world. While Russia [as heard] is primarily concerned with potential threats emanating from Israeli missile developments, the Europeans are concerned about the ballistic missile proliferation in the North Africa and West Asia region. Since the French proposal suggests implementing only controls on missile launches and not the total ban, the situation will allow sufficient room for missile developments by the major powers as well as create a space for political pressure play.

The French proposal also indicates an interesting turn of events as they along with the British have always been viewing nuclear weapons as the ultimate form of deterrence. Having accepted a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, to what extent would they go along in accepting renunciation of nuclear weapons? The only possible objection could be from China which has recently tested a very high yield nuclear device. Objections on the grounds of accuracies and verification capabilities have also become manageable with improvements in sensor technologies. In any case, a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban is easier to monitor than the chemical weapons ban which has been agreed upon under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Notwithstanding the fact that the proposal calls for a five-nation cooperation toward evolving nuclear arms control, the American involvement holds the key to its successful implementation. The new U.S. president, Bill Clinton's responses to the French initiative can be examined in the context of his known position on nuclear arms

control. He has advocated a two-step process leading to a full and comprehensive nuclear test ban. It, inter alia, begins with establishment of stronger supplier controls on preventing clandestine leakage of nuclear technology. In substance, the U.S. Government aims to build a more coherent international response amongst the nuclear haves against the potential proliferation. An initiative of this kind would require Russian and Chinese participation.

India has been all along calling for a comprehensive nuclear test ban by the nuclear powers as an indicator of their genuine intentions. Acceptance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban would also dilute India's objection to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty—NPT—significantly. The timing of the proposal reflects the priority being given by the Western countries to controlling weapons of mass destruction, particularly the nuclear weapons. And possibly this proposal is the first of a series of initiatives which would lead to neutralizing the objections of the nuclear have-not states against the NPT which is coming up for extension in 1995.

ISRAEL

Foreign Minister: Israel To Sign CW Convention

TA1711190492 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English
1800 GMT 17 Nov 92

[Text] Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres says that Israel will be among the first countries in the world to sign the convention banning the spread of chemical weapons [CW]. The convention will be available for signature at UN Headquarters in New York from next January.

Answering a question in the Knesset, the foreign minister also said that a number of countries in the region, including Syria, Libya, and Iran, were continuing to develop and arm themselves with chemical weapons. He hoped the Arab states would also express readiness to inhere to the convention unconditionally.

PAKISTAN

UN Adopts South Asia NFZ Proposal

BK1311115092 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in English 1100 GMT 13 Nov 92

[Text] At the United Nations, the Pakistani proposal for establishing a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] in South Asia has been adopted by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly's main committee. The draft, co-sponsored by Bangladesh, received 117 votes in favor, 12 abstentions, and only India and Bhutan against. There was another big shift by France which supported the resolution, thus mounting pressure on India to accept the regional solution to nuclear nonproliferation.

The committee also adopted another Pakistani draft co-sponsored by a record number of 80 countries that upholds the concept of regional disarmament in nuclear field. With the coming aboard of France, all the five nuclear-weapon powers now support the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; that is, the concept of regional disarmament in the nuclear field. Diplomats regard as significant the switch in the position of France, saying it would have far-reaching implications on a series of proposals made by Pakistan to ensure that South Asia remains free of nuclear weapons. It also gave boost to Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif's proposal for the establishment of a non-proliferation regime in South Asia.

GENERAL

Kurchatov Aide Reminisces on Nuclear Arms Program

934P0012A Moscow POISK in Russian No 38,
12-18 Sep 92 p 14

[Article by Igor Golovin, prepared by Yuliya Bogatikova:
"A Bomb for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"]

[Text] A great deal has been said and written about the development and use of nuclear weapons. In recent times, however, reports containing new facts about history have started to appear. In the race for sensation, however, journalists sometimes present poorly checked facts. So today we decided to talk about some authentic facts, and we turned to a witness of those far-off events, Doctor of Physicomathematical Sciences Igor Golovin, erstwhile deputy to Igor Kurchatov for science and now a laboratory chief at the Institute of Atomic Energy imeni I.V. Kurchatov. This is his account.

The Beginning of the Research

The French started to study the atomic nucleus in the 1890's. Then, in the early 1900's, the Curie couple discovered the element radium, and in 1919 Ernest Rutherford recorded an artificial nuclear reaction for the first time. In our country, research on the atomic nucleus started with the study of radioactive substances. Way back in 1922, Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadskiy set up the Radium Institute in Leningrad, where technology was developed for extracting radium from uranium ore. And in 1932, at the Leningrad Physicotechnical Institute that bears the name of Ioffe, a special laboratory was set up in which Igor Kurchatov started to conduct his research on the atomic nucleus.

Late in 1938, German radiochemists at the Institute of Chemistry in Berlin discovered a new kind of reaction that was named the fission reaction. At the same time, Kurchatov and his associates became very active in studying these processes. The physicists Yuliy Khariton and Yakov Zeldovich, who worked at the Institute of Chemical Physics under the leadership of Academician Nikolay Semenov, became involved in the work. And in the summer of 1939 they reported that it turned out from their calculations that it was possible to make a very powerful bomb containing only 10 to 20 kilograms of uranium with an atomic weight of 235. And the detonation of such a bomb would have enough force to demolish all of Moscow and Moscow Oblast. At that time I was a graduate student, and this fact truly astonished me. For in order to make such an explosion, what was needed was not natural uranium, but the isotope uranium-235 separated from it, which in nature makes up only 0.7 percent of natural uranium. The puzzle was how to separate the uranium-235 from the natural uranium. I thought that it would be 20 years before people learned how to separate out the necessary uranium isotope.

Nevertheless, Nikolay Semenov wrote a memorandum to the Ministry of the Chemical Industry, saying that a new nuclear reaction had been discovered and that they were studying it in Kurchatov's laboratory. No reply was received to the letter. But in the USSR Academy of

Sciences a uranium commission was set up just the same. It included academicians Vitaliy Khlopin, Abram Ioffe, Vladimir Vernadskiy, and Aleksandr Fersman. And they started to draw up research plans. Properly speaking, Khariton and Zeldovich had discovered two possibilities for the uranium fission reaction—explosive and controlled—in which the energy given off could be used as a source of heat. And since many people did not understand all the intricacies of this new phenomenon, various kinds of incidents started to happen. I remember that an architect who had been involved in work on the project for the Palace of the Soviets on the site of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior came to me and asked: "Everything in the palace should be advanced. Is it possible to make a uranium chandelier to illuminate the palace building?" I convinced him that this was impossible, because it was possible to die from strong radiation.

And so the work to study the nuclear reaction continued. In October 1940 at an Academy of Sciences meeting especially devoted to the latest research on the atomic nucleus, Kurchatov talked in his report about the possibility of developing a nuclear reactor. After an exchange of opinions, it was decided not to ask the government to allocate additional appropriations to build such a reactor, because a war was going on in Europe, and the money was needed for more urgent things.

But before this, in 1939, the American physicists Edward Teller and Han Bethe had written a letter and sent it to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. It was pointed out in the letter that a new kind of uranium fission reaction had been discovered and that it was necessary to start on the development of an atomic bomb, because if Hitler were to acquire such a bomb, it would become a very terrible weapon in his hands, and it was therefore necessary to beat him to it.

Laboratory No 2

When the Great Patriotic War started, work on research into the uranium nucleus was halted. There were more important problems for the physicists. However, right at the beginning of the war information started to come in from intelligence that in England they were engaged in the development of a top-secret uranium bomb. Then the young physicist Georgiy Flerov, who was at an Air Force school in Yoshkar-Ola, wrote a letter to Stalin's aide, in which he talked about the need to develop work on uranium here. Receiving no answer, Flerov traveled to Kazan, whither the USSR Academy of Sciences had been evacuated for the war, and he presented a report to the leading physicists, in which he also noted that it was necessary to continue the work. However, Flerov's conclusions seemed unsubstantiated to the physicists. Disillusioned, Flerov left Kazan. But in April 1942 he wrote another very angry letter to Stalin. Stalin is supposed to have read that letter, and it was considered to be disinformation and an attempt to delay the state. At the same time, however, regular reports started to come in from intelligence agents that across the ocean they were doing work to develop nuclear weapons. Stalin was alarmed, and he ordered the leading physicists to meet.

Vitaliy Khlopin, Abram Ioffe, Vladimir Vernadskiy, and Petr Kapitsa were summoned to Stalin. They admitted

that in principle the development of such a bomb was possible. Then Stalin asked which of the physicists could head up development of a nuclear bomb. Lavrentiy Beriia proposed Ioffe, but Stalin proposed Kapitsa. However, after consideration Stalin arrived at the thought that neither was needed. They were, after all, notable physicists, and the task set for them might interfere with their main activity. What was needed was a young and energetic scientist for whom this kind of task could be a life's goal. And at that meeting Ioffe suggested Kurchatov as a candidate. After some time Kurchatov was summoned to Stalin, and the latter informed the scientist of the results of the meeting. Kurchatov said that it was a very responsible task, and he asked for three days to consider it. And he returned to Kazan in order to take counsel with his friend and colleague Anatoliy Aleksandrov. Aleksandrov then said to Kurchatov: "You are very well able to lead people and to inspire them in their work. So you should undertake to carry out the task set for you." And three days later, as he had promised, Kurchatov informed Stalin that he agreed to head up the work.

In February 1943 a State Committee for Defense resolution was promulgated, naming Igor Kurchatov as the head of the uranium program. It was also decided to set up a secret laboratory. And on 12 April 1943 a resolution on the USSR Academy of Sciences was issued, setting up Laboratory 2. So the work on the uranium nucleus was revived.

Kurchatov demanded that Yuliy Khariton, Yakov Zeldovich, Georgiy Flerov, Isaak Kikoin, and Abram Alikhanov work along with him. They were all given several rooms in the Moskva Hotel, and a still-uncompleted building was allocated as the laboratory that subsequently became the main building of our institute. And it was there that the first research was conducted.

The Intelligence Reports

I do not have accurate information on this, but it seems that in the spring of 1943, intelligence reports started to come in that on 2 December 1942, using a nuclear reactor that he had developed, Enrico Fermi in the United States had demonstrated for the first time in the world a chain reaction with release of energy from inside the nucleus. Kurchatov decided to duplicate this reaction. The fact is that it followed from the theory of the great Niels Bohr, who had developed the science on the atomic nucleus, that uranium-239, a chemical element that had not yet been obtained, would be a good material for the atomic charge. And Kurchatov realized that by initiating this kind of chain reaction in a nuclear reactor, it would be possible to obtain a new explosive substance, which was subsequently named plutonium. Properly speaking, uranium with an atomic weight of 235, which can be obtained from natural uranium, and plutonium are the two substances that serve as the charge in nuclear weapons. Moreover, it would be possible to develop two kinds of nuclear reactors, which would use either uranium and graphite or uranium and heavy water. And throughout 1943 and 1944, discussions went on among the scientists about which could be made more quickly, the uranium-graphite reactor or the uranium-heavy water reactor. It became clear that the Moscow Electronics Plant could quickly organize production of pure graphite. Production of heavy uranium, however, also became possible; in November 1944 Professor

Nikolay Sazhin and his colleague Zinaida Yershova obtained the first samples of metallic uranium. And the method for obtaining the heavy water had also been long known; it was electrolysis.

So, with this knowledge and some intelligence reports, the work was started. All intelligence information was held in the strictest secrecy, but Kurchatov was granted permission to familiarize himself with it.

The Purloined Blueprint

In the summer of 1945 Kurchatov was presented with a blueprint of the atomic bomb passed on from intelligence. Stalin was worried that it might be disinformation. Kurchatov said Khariton should familiarize himself with this blueprint; he was in charge of the design for the atomic bomb. All possible kinds of studies and experiments conducted in the design bureau in Laboratory 2 showed that the blueprint was quite sensible and plausible. Then Stalin decided to make a bomb following the blueprint exactly. It should be said that in wartime this was always the practice. For example, when an American B-29 bomber crashed on our territory, Tupolev was ordered to make an accurate copy of it. Of course, it is much quicker and more reliable to reproduce something than to conceive it oneself. And that is how they proceeded with the atomic bomb. True, our physicists did propose other versions for a bomb design—ones that were more lightweight and less costly. Stalin, however, insisted on his idea. For at that time it was already known that bomb tests were taking place at a proving site in New Mexico, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been bombed. But in order to make a bomb according to the "purloined" blueprint, it was necessary to develop a gigantic industry in short order to produce the necessary materials. For in 1945 we did not have the main material—plutonium. In Laboratory 2 the first experiments were set up to obtain plutonium. Then, on 25 December 1945, the first nuclear reactor went into operation. At the same time it was necessary to mine uranium ore and to build plants to produce metallic uranium. And by 1949 everything was ready for the tests.

The Spy Fuchs

Tests of the Soviet atomic bomb were successful. And the leadership in the United States was terribly troubled by this event, and decided that the Soviets could not have made the bomb independently in so short a time. The American CIA conducted a thorough investigation and concluded that the theoretical physicist Klaus Fuchs, who had been involved in the work on the atomic project, first in England and later in the United States at the secret center at Los Alamos, had been actively engaged in espionage. He was arrested, and they demanded that he be put to death in the electric chair. But Fuchs was handed over to Great Britain, and he had to be judged according to the laws of that country. The English found the Americans' charges inadequate, and they sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. Incidentally, Fuchs himself later admitted that in fact he had passed information on the atomic bomb to the Soviets because he had believed that it was impermissible that this kind of work should have been done in secret from the allies in the struggle against fascist Germany.

It is now known that in addition to Fuchs, there were other sources of information. Up to now, however, it has not been possible to establish the names of the spies definitely.

Development of the Superbomb

After we had exploded our own bomb, U.S. President Harry Truman sent a proposal to the U.S. Congress that a superbomb be developed—the hydrogen bomb. Many physicists at that time were against this kind of inhuman weapon, but somehow or other the work was started. Our government was also worried about this issue. The research to develop such a weapon was then assigned to Igor Tamm, then a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. I even suspect that it was at my own direction, because I always used to say to Kurchatov that Tamm should participate in our work. And when the subject turned to the development of the hydrogen bomb, Kurchatov also proposed that Tamm be recruited for the work. Work was started at the USSR Academy of Sciences Physics Institute. Tamm's group included the young candidate of sciences Andrey Sakharov, doctors of sciences Vitaliy Ginsburg and Semen Belenkiy, and other scientists. Right at the beginning of 1948, Sakharov proposed a variant for the hydrogen bomb. It was the opinion of Khariton, Zeldovich, and Kurchatov that this variant deserved the most serious attention. So in 1950 Tamm and Sakharov were transferred to Khariton's secret laboratory at Arzamas, where they began intensive work. Sakharov's model outdistanced the development proposed by the Americans, in particular by the physicist Edward Teller.

In 1952 something similar to a hydrogen bomb was detonated in the United States. Similar because it was the two-story building of a laboratory filled with liquid hydrogen. And less than a year later, in August 1953, our own hydrogen bomb—made, in contrast to the atomic bomb, "without prompting"—was detonated at the Semipalatinsk test site.

After so many years of the senseless nuclear arms race, the confrontation between the two superpowers has finally ended. We have abandoned the policy that the Bolsheviks pursued. And even Teller, the "father" of the American hydrogen bomb, has said that he developed it not for a struggle against the Russian people, but for the struggle against Bolshevism. Three weeks ago, Teller visited our institute. Now he has said that we wasted exorbitant amounts of money on weapons and ruined the peoples instead of multiplying their prosperity. And now the main task for our country is to switch industry to peaceful purposes and to use military objects that have already been developed, like laser installations, to preserve life on the Earth rather than to destroy it.

Mikhaylov Comments On Nuclear Weapons Museum

934P0015A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
20 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by Vladimir Gubarev: "Nuclear Weapons Museum"]

[Text] Russian Minister of Atomic Power Viktor Mikhaylov once said:

"Our people shouldn't fear nuclear weapons, but be proud of them, since they have helped preserve peace on the planet and ensured the motherland's security."

"But most of us have not only not seen nuclear warheads firsthand, we haven't even seen pictures of them, since these things are considered very secret," I objected. "And people are always afraid of things they have never seen. Incidentally, in my opinion, there is nothing secret about the 'wares' that were produced in the beginning of the atomic age. But modern weapons are another thing."

"You know," the minister said smiling, "even most of the residents of such cities as Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, where the terrifying weapons are produced, have never seen them. For many years, they didn't even know what exactly they were working on."

Mikhaylov's statement was no exaggeration. On a visit to Arzamas-16, as I examined the various machinery and work areas, I often asked the people I spoke with: "Did you really know exactly where you were working and on what?" And I most often heard a negative answer. The secrecy was extremely strict. Academician Trutnev, one of the thermonuclear weapon's developers, related an almost anecdotal incident. A proving ground was visited by a group of specialists, among them an employee of Arzamas-16. It seems he was a test specialist. Tests on the hydrogen bomb were to be conducted the next day, and they were standing around and talking right next to it (the "product" had not yet been uncovered). The test specialist happened to lean over the bomb, resting his elbows on it.

"They just broadcast a speech by the chairman of the council of ministers," the specialist said. "We have developed a hydrogen weapon. Can you imagine, this means that somewhere in this country we have a center that is working on such an enormously powerful weapon! I'd sure like to go there and see the place!"

Everyone burst out laughing in unison. Only then did the test specialist find out what he was resting his elbows on.

It was after that test that negotiations on banning atmospheric, surface, and underwater testing—negotiations on which the physicists at Arzamas-16, under the direction of Academician Sakharov, had insisted on—began to make more progress, and soon the tests were banned altogether.

Every exhibit at the museum represents a page of history. They can be viewed and interpreted in different ways. People can take delight in them or denigrate them, be proud or condemn them—it all depends on an opponent's viewpoint. But that history has already occurred, it exists, and we are obliged to know it and to communicate the truth of those times to not only our contemporaries, but also our children and grandchildren. In my opinion, this cause is served by the exhibits at the Nuclear Weapons Museum.

The opening of a museum of this type is undoubtedly an unusual event. Not just the city's residents but also visitors will be able to learn about its "main output." And a lot of guests are visiting Arzamas-16—not just journalists, but also scientists and specialists from various countries of the world. Their interest in this major Russian research center can be readily explained and understood; for a broad

process of disarmament—in particular nuclear disarmament—is getting under way, and once again, Arzamas-16 is playing a major role in it. I think that everyone will understand that only an insignificant portion of all nuclear weapons types are represented here—for our country is scrupulously complying with the principles of nuclear arms nonproliferation, and they were meticulously observed in setting up the exhibits. We cannot allow a situation in which some dictatorial regime could take advantage of our experience.

What exactly can be seen at the museum?

I meticulously copied down all the information on the signs that are mounted beside the exhibits:

"THE USSR'S FIRST ATOMIC BOMB. Produced in 1951. Yield: 20 kilotonnes of TNT. Bomb was flight tested. Weapon was never placed in service."

"USSR'S FIRST SERIES-PRODUCED ATOMIC BOMB. Placed in service in 1953. Yield: 30 kilotonnes of TNT."

"WORLD'S FIRST HYDROGEN BOMB. Yield: 400 kilotonnes of TNT. Weapon tested on August 12, 1953, at the Semipalatinsk proving ground."

"FIRST NUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE. Placed in service in 1956. Range: up to 1,200 kilometers. Yield: 40 kilotonnes of TNT."

"THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR STRATEGIC MISSILE MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE."

"FIRST SERIES-PRODUCED NUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR TACTICAL MISSILE."

"FIRST THERMONUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC MISSILE. Placed in service in 1958. Flight range: 8,500 kilometers. Yield: three megatonnes of TNT."

"WORLD'S MOST POWERFUL EXPERIMENTAL THERMONUCLEAR AERIAL BOMB. Tested in 1962 at Novaya Zemlya proving ground. Altitude: 4,500 meters. Rated power: 100 megatonnes of TNT. Tested at half-yield."

In a corner of the hall is a control panel. At first glance, it is not a very sophisticated device. There are several switches that activate various systems. At the center of the control panel is the main switch. It is enclosed in a high-strength transparent glass case. Just to the side is a special lock, intended to prevent any unauthorized person from opening the case and throwing the switch. These days, the unsophisticated device (the lock looks like one that might be found on a barn door) might draw smiles—how primitive the technology was in those days! In my opinion, this exhibit in particular graphically demonstrates how far technology has progressed over the past 50 years. And it reminds us once more: If we neglect the development of science today, we could return to the past from which, thanks to the talent and labors of several generations, we have advanced so far.

Defense Ministry Treaty Directorate Chief Interviewed

PM0611141592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Nov 92 p 3

[Interview with Major General D.K. Kharchenko, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry's International Treaty Directorate, by Manki Ponomarev; place, date not given: "State Security Is Our Priority"]

[Text] Major General Dmitriy Konstantinovich Kharchenko was born in Vladikavkaz in November 1947. He joined the army in 1965. He graduated from the G.I. Zhukov Air Defense Military Command Academy in 1977 and from the General Staff Academy in 1990. He served in the Air Defense Forces. He was an aiming and guidance officer and commander of an air defense battalion and a combined unit. He fulfilled his international duty in Egypt.

Since August 1992 he has been chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry International Treaty Directorate.

[Ponomarev] Dmitriy Konstantinovich, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry International Treaty Directorate is a relatively new subdivision. It seems to be the successor to the former General Staff Treaty-Legal Directorate. With what was this transformation connected?

[Kharchenko] The International Treaty Directorate really is the successor to the General Staff Treaty-Legal Directorate. In this sense its purpose remains, by and large, as before: to organize and ensure the international process of talks on questions of security and the reduction of troops and arms.

But the new foreign policy realities—the breakup of the USSR and the resultant problems of the nearby foreign parts, the formation of the CIS, the setting up of the Defense Ministry in Russia—required serious corrections to the status and tasks of the former directorate.

The activities of the newly created International Treaty Directorate go beyond the General Staff. In the sphere of its own responsibility it is now a head organ on the scale of the entire Defense Ministry. In addition to the former tasks, the International Treaty Directorate has also been entrusted with certain new ones. They stem, first, from the broadening of the areas of the process of talks on disarmament topics. For example, we are now involved in talks on a global defense system and in drawing up a full-scale document on a framework accord between the Russian and U.S. presidents on further deep reductions in strategic offensive arms, etc. Second, they stem from the increased number of subjects of interstate talks and previously concluded agreements.

All this has been reflected in the structure of the International Treaty Directorate. In particular, a department has been set up—or, as we are accustomed to calling it, a sector—which participates in the organization of talks with states that used to belong to the Soviet Union.

[Ponomarev] Speaking of the arms limitation and reduction talks, we should evidently dwell primarily on the 1991 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms. What, in your view, is its significance today?

[Kharchenko] The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or the START Treaty, as it is called for short, is a major contribution to lowering tension on a global scale and strengthening strategic stability. Its realization is making it possible to begin bringing the composition of strategic nuclear forces into line with the level of the existing danger of war and with the principle of defense sufficiency.

[Ponomarev] This treaty was concluded, Dmitriy Konstantinovich, in the name of the United States and the USSR. But now the Soviet Union no longer exists, and strategic offensive arms are not only in the United States and Russia but also on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which used to belong to the USSR. Who is party to the treaty now?

[Kharchenko] An important question. I will remind you that the Protocol to the START Treaty was signed at the meeting of the Russian, Belarusian, Kazakh, Ukrainian, and U.S. foreign ministers in Lisbon in May. In accordance with this protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine assumed the commitments of the former USSR under the treaty. Under the Lisbon protocol Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine adopted pledges to subscribe to the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as soon as possible. And to subscribe to it—I wish particularly to emphasize this—as nonnuclear states.

Mindful of these circumstances, we should draw the incontestable conclusion that, of all the members of the Commonwealth, only Russia can be a nuclear state. It must bear all responsibility for the nuclear weapons of the former USSR.

[Ponomarev] The Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the START Treaty Wednesday. The U.S. Senate did so one month earlier. Why was there this delay? How do things stand with ratification of the treaty by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine?

[Kharchenko] The delay can be blamed, above all, on the treaty's complexity and on our parliamentarians' legitimate desire to make an attentive study of its provisions and to weigh all the consequences associated with its realization. In addition, the fact that the CIS has been formed undoubtedly influenced the pace of ratification. Nuclear weapons of the former USSR, as we have already said, ended up on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which became parties to the treaty. It was examined in the parliaments of these states, and Kazakhstan ratified it as early as July. The ratification process has entered the final stage in Belarus and Ukraine.

[Ponomarev] The START Treaty is an important stage on the way to reducing and limiting nuclear arms. An important stage, but not the last one. The so-called "framework accord" on a further major reduction of strategic offensive arms—to 3,000-3,500 units on each side—was reached during President B. Yeltsin's U.S. visit. It is now possible to encounter in the U.S. press allegations that Russia is hindering the transformation of this accord in principle into a full-scale treaty and advancing unacceptable terms. How do things stand here?

[Kharchenko] The framework accord is an agreement on a political plane, above all. The drafting of a legal document—the text of a treaty—on this basis is a complex and laborious process. The future treaty must take into account the balance of both sides' interests in such a vitally important sphere as nuclear arms and nuclear security.

The United States submitted its own draft document to us. We examined it attentively and drew the conclusion that its individual provisions require more specific wording and that some more work must be done on them. We familiarized the Americans with our viewpoint. Work is continuing at present, and the questions that arise are chiefly of a technical nature.

[Ponomarev] The signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was a major achievement. Then difficulties arose over its interpretation and in connection with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. Who now are the parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe?

[Kharchenko] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 by the heads of state and government of 22 countries. The process of realizing the treaty began on 17 July 1992.

The number of subjects of the treaty has changed as a result of the changes in East European countries and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Precisely 29 states are now parties to it: the 16 NATO countries, five East European states that were members of the Warsaw Pact Organization, and eight states that are former republics of the USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) and that are in the treaty's zone of application.

[Ponomarev] So, are the main difficulties behind us now?

[Kharchenko] No, serious new problems have arisen, connected with the treaty's realization. Thus, in accordance with the requirements of this document, the participant states submitted information on their armed forces on the date of its signing. Next it was made more precise, and new data was submitted the moment the treaty came into force. They were significantly different from the original data. The total quantity of arms and hardware to be limited under the treaty had diminished. This is connected, above all, with the fact that some of the arms ascribed to the USSR had ended up outside the European part of Russia—moreover, frequently in places where combat operations are being conducted, as in the Transcaucasus, and where it is difficult to count them. In addition, double counting of the selfsame arms has come about in various states of the former USSR—in Russia and Ukraine, for example, with respect to arms of the marines and of airborne units.

The fulfillment of commitments under the treaty is also complicated by the fact that the total norms for the reduction of arms and military hardware have ended up lower than the reduction norm for the former USSR. The Russian Federation is in a difficult position: Its reduction norms could increase because certain states that are legal successors do not submit information on the receipt of arms and hardware from the former Union.

Nevertheless, Russia firmly intends to fulfill all the provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe. For this, in particular, the Directorate for Realizing the Reduction of Armed Forces and Strategic Arms has been formed in the Defense Ministry. Ministry representatives are holding consultations and talks with military experts from other CIS countries to agree on unresolved questions.

[Ponomarev] Reports that Russia is allegedly violating its pledges in the sphere of chemical weapons have appeared in foreign mass media and in certain Russian newspapers.

[Kharchenko] I know of these reports. But there is a point here that their authors ignore deliberately or, maybe, simply out of ignorance. The thing is that neither Russia nor any other state has pledged to end the development of chemical weapons. Incidentally, nor have any bilateral or multilateral agreements not to produce them yet come into force. And yet, despite this, in 1987 we ceased production of such weapons, and since then we have observed a voluntarily adopted moratorium.

As for the United States, according to the data we have, the development of chemical weapons has not ended there and is continuing at the present time. One area of it covers new types of binary weapons based, for example, on toxins of intermediate volatility. A special role is also allocated to nonlethal toxins.

I wish to point out that a ban on the development, production, and use of chemical weapons and also the destruction of stockpiles of them are provided for in the corresponding draft convention, whose preparation was completed in September. It is planned to open it for signing in Paris in January 1993.

[Ponomarev] Problems of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries and from other nearby foreign states directly affect many readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. How are the difficulties that are arising in this connection being resolved?

[Kharchenko] One point should be made clear at once. Because there has been a considerable increase recently in the volume of tasks connected with the Russian troop withdrawal, a directorate has been set up in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to tackle this question directly. This does not mean, however, that the International Treaty Directorate remains a detached observer. The whole package of problems of bilateral relations with each of the nearby foreign states, including those connected with the troop withdrawal, is being examined within the framework of bilateral talks. The delegations at such talks include, as experts, representatives of the International Treaty Directorate.

Another important aspect of the International Treaty Directorate's activity connected with nearby foreign countries is the coordination of the efforts of interested states in realizing the START Treaty and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. All these problems are reflected in international legal acts that are being drawn up, including with the very active participation of our directorate. We seek to ensure that they take Russia's security interests most fully into account.

Commentary Advocates Regional Conference on Asian Nuclear Policy

*LD0711173092 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 7 Nov 92*

[Commentary by Aleksey Kondratyev]

[Text] Amid reports about nuclear ambitions by a number of Asian countries, two opposite trends seem to be under way in the continent in the sphere of nuclear policies. And we follow with a commentary by Aleksey Kondratyev.

On the one hand steps are being taken to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Russia for one has ratified and is already taking measures to cut the number of long range nuclear weapons under the Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Moscow has also announced its nuclear weapons were no longer targetted on Asian countries and has extended its moratorium on nuclear testing. Three other former Soviet republics including Kazakhstan agreed on the transfer and subsequent elimination of former Soviet tactical weapons on Russian territory.

As an encouraging sign China joins the Nonproliferation Treaty and the Americans have withdrawn their nuclear weapons from South Korea. But on the other hand as if in a show of rivalry, two Asian giants, India and Pakistan, have both spoken of their ability to produce nuclear weapons. There are also reports about Iran's intention to join the ranks of nuclear powers in five to eight years from now and speculations are under way that Tehran has already begun its own nuclear program.

Despite the agreement with Seoul, Pyongyang is still reluctant to open up its nuclear installations for mutual inspection. For its part Israel is believed to be in possession of 100 nuclear bombs and doesn't want to curtail its nuclear program. Such are the realities of today and there's growing concern about a possible spread of nuclear weapons in Asia.

India is unwilling to join the Nonproliferation Treaty on the grounds that it's unjust and discriminatory towards the non-nuclear countries. For the same reason Delhi is opposed to the idea of denuclearizing South Asia. It and other Asian countries ambitious to have their own nuclear weapons bring up what they think strong enough arguments to support their case but the fact is Asia is in the face of widespread nuclear proliferation on the continent.

Is there a way out? One way of redressing the lamentable situation is to improve international environment including Asia's and a recent move by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan for a regional conference on confidence-building measures in Asia merits attention. Among other things such a forum may well discuss the problem of nonproliferation in the continent, something that no one but the Asian countries themselves will be able to resolve.

Yeltsin Addresses British Parliament in London

*LD1011232792 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1720 GMT 10 Nov 92*

[Address by President Boris Yeltsin to the British Parliament in London on 10 November—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Lord Chancellor, esteemed Mrs. Speaker, esteemed members of the British Parliament, ladies and gentlemen:

I consider it a great honor for the Russian president to speak in the Royal Gallery of the Palace of Westminster. Here, in the British Parliament, which has a history many centuries old, I represent one of the world's youngest democracies, namely democratic and free Russia. [passage omitted]

After the times of confrontation, things are difficult not only for Russia. Almost all developed countries are experiencing a difficult phase, and you have difficulties as well. However, the first bricks have been laid in the building of a new world structure. The leading states are demonstrating unprecedented cooperation in establishing peace, security, and stability. We value highly the open and constant dialogue between Moscow and the world's main political centers on key international problems. This is a real result of our practical cooperation. I am convinced that the level of mutual understanding and trust achieved is far from its limits. I consider that today the time has come to raise the question of changing the nature of Russia's relations with the West from relations between partners to relations between allies. We are no longer potential opponents, no longer potential enemies, we are friends, and we must be allies in this world.

Of course, we are not talking about some sort of closed alliance and certainly not about creating a military bloc. No. We have already moved away from that. What I have in mind is, first of all, trust and mutual understanding, the level of which could be raised considerably, as was shown by yesterday's talks. Having an alliance relationship implies the final elimination of military confrontation, the final elimination. I state this firmly and confidently.

A reliable system has already been set up for mutual monitoring [kontrol] of what are known as the armored fists. There is a treaty on limiting armed forces in Europe, the open skies regime, national means of observation. All this is a firm bridle restraining the military machine both in the West and in the East, and I think that in the future the distinction between West and East will simply not exist.

I signed a decree a few days ago extending until 1 July next year the year-long moratorium on nuclear testing which Russia declared in October last year.

I want to stress that this moratorium can be extended in the future, if the appropriate conditions are there for this. It is illogical to destroy nuclear warheads while at the same time testing new nuclear weaponry. I hope that nuclear tests will be halted by all countries. The first step has been taken. France and the United States have stopped them.

Of course, dismantling the nuclear arsenal will take several years. For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons will, to all appearances, remain an important factor in international politics, and we in this sense respect and view the British position with understanding. This places a parallel task before us: Not to allow the spread of nuclear missile weaponry. This is the most important thing. Here, much depends on the positions and the agreed actions of these nuclear powers. Practically the whole potential of expertise

and the most modern military technologies and materials fall precisely to them. The quicker we eliminate the rudiments of confrontational thinking, the more effective our cooperation will become and the more reliable control over the nuclear and military technical potential will be. We have already at two factories—Chelyabinsk-65 and Arzams-16—this is what these closed towns were always called—and we now invite anyone who wishes to visit them. They are destroying the strategic nuclear forces, warheads, and missiles.

Here, we pose the question more widely. What is needed is political control over the military establishment as a whole. In the final analysis, the threat to the security of Europe and the world as a whole comes not from the weapons, as such, but from the political regime which has its hands on the weapons. We are grateful to you for giving us the opportunity to represent Great Britain in the aggressive country of Iraq. [applause]

In the final analysis, the threat to the security of Europe comes precisely from the countries which today threaten peace and security. In this regard, we should be alert together.

Mighty military machines were created in all the developed countries during the confrontational years, subordinating to themselves a very considerable proportion of the economy. This is one of the most important problems for Russia. Practically 50 percent of Russia's industry worked for the military industry. We reduced the output of military equipment and weapons by 68 percent and reduced the military budget by 18 percent this year. That is impressive. [applause]

Strict controls over the military sphere are being established in our country. The Defense Ministry, the Security Ministry—the former KGB—the Interior Ministry, the foreign intelligence service, and even the Foreign Ministry are openly subordinate to the president and sincerely reliable. I look at Foreign Minister Kozyrev; Defense Minister Grachev is here, too. Yesterday, they signed an agreement on military cooperation, an agreement without precedent in three, four, or five decades, an unprecedented agreement. It was signed yesterday in the presence of the Russian president and the British prime minister. [applause]

The demilitarization of industry, science, and all fields of Russian life has become a practical task. I have said that the amount allocated to all these spheres has been sharply reduced this year. At the same time, the dismantling of such a gigantic military mechanism requires considerable effort, for millions of people are being left without work, and we have to think about this too. I am grateful to the British leadership, which is helping financially with the transportation and destruction of Russia's strategic nuclear weapons.

We do not have the right not to support the millions of people connected to the military-industrial complex, when a cruel turning point is occurring in their lives. It is unjustified to destroy modern production which may be changed over to civilian purposes. Russia has such a state conversion program, it is in action, it is carrying things out, it is working. [passage omitted]

Shumeyko Says Military Spending One-Eighth of USSR's Expenses*OW1011173492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1708 GMT 10 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's military expenses in 1993 will be no higher than $\frac{1}{8}$ the military expenses of the former USSR were last year, announced Russian Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko. He also stressed that the Russian Government plans to make major changes in the budget policy "in the near future." Appearing at an international banking conference in Moscow, the vice premier emphasized that the government plans to give local powers the right to allocate a major part of budget expenses. Currently 75% of all budget expenses are spent at the federal level and 25% at local levels.

Kozyakov Comments on Proposed U.S. Arms Reductions*LD1311211192 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 13 Nov 92*

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] President-elect of the United States Bill Clinton has named further cutbacks of nuclear and other weapons among top priorities of the American foreign policy. He believes this must be done in conformity with the end of the Cold War brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the reforming of the Russian Army and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Here is a commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov:

This trend in the policy of the United States for the next four years stems from the strategy announced even before the presidential election and based on the assumption that the international standing of a country is largely determined by the success of its domestic economy. Such an approach correlates with similar tendencies manifest in many countries. Significantly, the former adversaries, the United States and Russia, together with the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States, emerging to replace the former Soviet Union, are now acting like partners, with Washington even lagging behind in the reduction of armed forces and armaments and their transfer within the national borders.

Of course, the process of dismantling the huge military machines created for decades has its own peculiarities in every single country and involves problems both material and ethical. But Russia and other CIS republics have been cutting their production of weapons at a faster speed than the United States. For instance, Russia has slashed its military expenditures by 70 percent recently. And as for the war industry, no other country in the world has had such a drop in the production of military equipment as Russia had in 1992. The Defense Ministry's orders for ammunition and hardware came down by 70 percent. Addressing a news conference in Moscow on Thursday, the First Deputy Defense Minister, Andrey Kokoshin, said we ordered, for example, only 20 tanks last year. We didn't order any self-propelled guns at all, and orders for new rockets can be counted in single digits.

Against the backdrop of such statements by the Russian military department, it's strange to hear the American Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, say that the United States should be careful in harvesting the peace dividends, as well as his warnings that economic shambles and warring factions in the former Soviet republics can quickly destabilize the region. According to him, the next four years will be more challenging in foreign policy than the previous one. A question arises whether the Pentagon really regards local conflicts on ethnic grounds underway in the other hemisphere as a serious reason for restarting the arms race. No matter how alarming today's reports from the CIS member-countries may be, they cannot provide reason enough for holding up the reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons. Officials in Moscow hope this process will continue on the basis of fruitful interaction between Russia and the United States.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS**Russian Decree on Utilization of Eliminated Missile Complexes****Army To Get New Housing***PM0611153192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Nov 92 p 1*

[Article by Oleg Falichev: "'Missiles-Housing' Project—A Creative Approach to Solving Social Problems"]

[Text] On 7 October this year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA wrote about how, under the START Treaty, the Strategic Rocket Forces had started removing some silo-based delivery vehicles. ("The country people heard no explosion, even though it was in a ballistic missile silo"). We spoke about how the considerable amounts of money obtained from the steel, precious metals, and technological equipment would be used to resolve urgent social programs for the missile troops.

But that was just, as they say, a "trial balloon" from the servicemen. Russian Federation Government Decree No. 820 "On the Rational Utilization for the National Economy of the Missile Complexes To Be Scrapped in Connection With the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons" was adopted 22 October 1992.

A lot has been written about the problems of building housing for servicemen and about the housing shortage. Readers are already sick of the subject. But, regrettably, it cannot yet be removed from the agenda. Why not?

Notwithstanding all our good intentions and even good laws and decrees, it is impossible to build thousands of apartments overnight. That takes funds, contract construction organizations, and materials... But now that the country is embracing the marketplace, the most unforeseeable difficulties are cropping up. That is reality, and we cannot close our eyes to it. What is the answer?

Clearly, it is to seek creative solutions and for both the "needy" and for state, local authority, and commercial structures to show initiative and resourcefulness, and to seek out mutual interests. One such example is the aforementioned decree, which envisages the further use of income "obtained from the rational utilization for the

national economy of the missile complexes to be scrapped in connection with the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons." Let's not bang the drum straight-away—nobody is immune to abuses, delays, or accidents. Clearly, it will only be apparent after a year or two just what the missile troops will gain from this action. But the "process" itself and the chosen vector of movement undoubtedly merit attention. So, just what will the decree signed by Ye. Gaydar provide the missile troops?

Before answering this question, we should explain that the project is mainly being financed out of attracting funds from domestic and foreign investors. Such as who? Mainly the ministries—as were—and departments which many years ago set up and equipped the Strategic Rocket Forces. Today they no longer exist, but their successors do—commercial structures, associations... These include the "Scientific and Technical Progress" Association for business cooperation with foreign countries, the "Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Conversion" Association, the "Joint-Stock Union for Conversion Activity" and "Recyclable Resources" joint-stock companies... These will not only use the available equipment and metal, but will do further work on the missiles to make them suitable for commissioning by domestic and foreign firms for commercial space launches, and will reequip launch complex territories for farming and construction.

Readers would be right to ask where are the guarantees that the funds thereby released will be used as planned rather than being squandered on other aims. Might it not be the case that there will be no money at all for building housing? For instance, a joint-stock company might pledge to dismantle a missile complex and give 20 percent of the profits to build housing for the missile troops. But there might not be any profit if the money raised by selling property is used on lavish payouts to "shareholders" or on various presentations and receptions... I think the main guarantee that resources will be preserved is that the general client for the project is the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. And all the work to develop commercial space rocket systems on the basis of missiles due to be scrapped will be coordinated by the Russian Space Agency. That is to say, structures which not only have an interest in, but are knowledgeable about the terrible housing situation for officers. Overall control will lie with the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property and the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance, which, together with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, are finalizing the elaboration of statute to determine the organization of the fulfillment of work under the project, the timetable and procedure for the handover of the missiles and combat launch complexes, the procedure for payment [raschety] for the work, and the utilization of the income received. It is planned that officers and warrant officers from military units, test ranges, and missile elimination bases will themselves participate in the work.

What has already been done? I put that question to Yu. Prudnikov, deputy general director of the "Recyclable Resources" Joint-Stock Company.

"We have submitted the plan for the construction of housing and its handover before the end of 1993 to the

Strategic Rocket Forces High Command," Yuriy Nikolayevich said. "But this will be no unfinished construction project: The funds realized have already been 'put to work'..."

Prudnikov said that it is planned to hand over several apartments for missile troops in Gatchina before the end of the year. The bulk of the housing (400 apartments) will be commissioned next year in St. Petersburg and the oblast. Leningrad Military District construction organizations and civilian construction firms are involved in this.

Also important is the fact that housing will be allocated to servicemen at preferential prices. Additional funds have been mobilized for this purpose.

One last point. The Army itself, of course, should not get involved in commerce. It has different tasks. But, since the conversion process is inevitable, it should get some real benefit out of it. And if it is approached intelligently and, above all, with concern for people in uniform, then good results can be achieved.

Decree Provisions Summarized

93P50019A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
11 Nov 92 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Missile Complexes Have New Purposes"]

[Text] Having spent in the past hundreds of billions of rubles for weapons, Soviet industry created an enormous missile potential, a part of which is slated to be destroyed according to the international obligations undertaken by the Russian Government. An important part of the missile weapons can be used for peaceful purposes, being used rationally on behalf of the economy and the population.

Taking account of such a possibility, the Russian Federation Government adopted on 22 October 1992 a decree "On the Rational Use for the National Economy of Missile Complexes Subject to Elimination in Connection With the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons."

The decree envisages the use of rocket motors and guidance systems after their reworking with the goal of using them for commercial launches of space vehicles for Russian and foreign firms. Part of the disassembled launchers, assemblies and materials are slated to be used in the national economy and for export. The "Missile-to-Housing" project envisages re-equipping the territory of launch complexes under farm management and the construction of housing for armed forces officers.

The government has accepted a proposal from interested ministries and agencies to involve several associations and joint-stock companies in the work to create commercial space-rocket systems on the basis of using missiles subject to elimination and to carry out the "Missiles-to-Housing" project.

The financing of this work, which is planned to be carried out mainly in 1993-1994, will be covered in part by allocations from the Russian Federation republic budget. Profits from carrying out the project will go to the construction of housing for armed forces officers and for the

scientific-technical servicing of the work of utilizing missile complexes and converting defense production

Ukrainian Premier: Western Attitude Threatens START Ratification

PM1011115592 Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Nov 92 p 4

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Kuchma by Roma Ihnatowicz in Kiev on 4 November: "Ukraine: An Interview With the New Prime Minister: Kuchma Warns West Over Ratification of START Treaty"]

[Text] Kiev—Leonid Kuchma, the new Ukrainian prime minister, is not a happy man. "The situation is even worse than the press said," the former director of the Yuzhmash missile plant confided to a small group of journalists on 4 November. As the heir to a "completely uncontrollable" situation of chaos and crisis (with inflation running at over 30 percent a month and preparations for strikes under way, especially in the Don mining region), Kuchma predicted "a wide-ranging social crisis unless we manage to stabilize the situation."

Kuchma emphasized the corruption gnawing at public life and the state economy. "It is all corrupt, from top to bottom." In a number of cases, the prime minister explained, it is difficult to establish that these activities are illegal but, he affirmed, whenever illegality can be proved the culprits will be brought to account.

Appointed less than one month ago, Leonid Kuchma has nevertheless settled the most pressing problem: The conflict with Russia over exchanges of commodities. Having agreed to provide Russia with the equivalent of 100 billion rubles' worth of goods, Ukraine has received supplies of oil, gas, and wood from Russia, thereby narrowly averting economic paralysis.

"They Want To Leave Us To Die..."

It is on the currency front that Kuchma is going to have to fight next. Criticizing the previous government, which did not take Ukraine out of the ruble zone on 1 October as initially planned, the prime minister explained that Ukraine had lost "tens of billions of rubles" as a result.

He himself decided to implement the process of replacing the ruble with the coupon, the interim unit of currency introduced last winter. He also plans to reduce the issue of credit (700 billion rubles in credit had been granted by the previous government) and to embark on privatization, beginning with small enterprises and finishing with the rest.

A perfect representative of large-scale industry, Kuchma does not balk at severe criticism of enterprise directors who promote "personal interests" instead of those of the Ukrainian economy. Kuchma is no less condemnatory of the West, which he accuses of talking instead of acting: "They want to leave us to die on our own." The West, he said, is pressuring Ukraine to prevent it from gaining access to the only markets where it could compete—space technology and weapons. Moreover, Ukraine is being asked to hand over its nuclear weapons to Russia "without getting anything in exchange"—neither guarantees of its

security nor material aid. Russia, meanwhile, he claims, is receiving a \$1 billion contract for the sale of nuclear fuel to the United States.

Kuchma warns that if these problems continue to be ignored the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the START treaty (the strategic arms limitation treaty signed by Bush and Gorbachev) threatens to become a "fiasco" for him and for President Kravchuk (Footnote: The START treaty was ratified by the Russian parliament on 4 November). Deputies are already beginning to openly voice doubts about the benefits of this treaty for Ukraine, he explained. "What advantage is there in all this for us?" the new prime minister asked in a decidedly bitter tone: "They are not giving us aid, just advice. But Ukraine is not as stupid as all that. We do not need so much advice."

Yeltsin Comments on Progress of Missile Elimination

LD1111033192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 2222 GMT 10 Nov 92

[Excerpts] London, 11 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin answered journalists' questions at a news conference on Tuesday on the results of his visit to Great Britain: [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] When you spoke in America in June, you said that Russian nuclear warheads would not be directed toward the West. Yet Marshal Shaposhnikov recently told us that the former position still exists. You say warm and kind words about us when you are here and in America, but at home you have quite different realities, including military ones. Can you tell us that what Marshal Shaposhnikov said is not true, and that the words you speak in the West coincide with what you say at home?

[Yeltsin] Absolutely, I will give you a totally frank answer. The Russian defense minister is present. I ask General Grachev to stand up. Today, all the strategic troops belong to Russia and are under Russian jurisdiction. They are given orders only by the president and by the defense minister. That is the first point.

The most important thing is that today we actively have begun to destroy strategic nuclear weapons, especially the most dangerous warheads of the SS-18 missiles. This is being done by Sverdlovsk-44, Arzamas-16, and Chelyabinsk-65. The enterprises that made them are the ones that are destroying them. What is more, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet ratified the START Treaty two days ago. That is the second point. We will abide by it without reservation.

Third: The framework [ramochnoye] agreement signed with Bush on the reduction and destruction by two-thirds of strategic nuclear weapons. We are ready to sign a treaty, and not only an outline agreement on this subject. I do not know [whether it will be] with the new president, Clinton, or whether we will succeed by 20 January with Mr. George Bush. Time will tell, but we are ready. The main thing is that we are ready.

Fourth: There are three states that, apart from Russia, have strategic nuclear weapons—Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. In Belarus, by my decree, all strategic troops

have transferred to Russian jurisdiction and are not subordinate to Belarus. Therefore, we are transporting all strategic nuclear warheads from there to Russian territory and we are destroying them. The same kind of talks are being conducted right now with Kazakhstan, and I believe that we will reach the same kind of accord. It is somewhat more difficult with Ukraine, but I believe that Great Britain and other countries will use their powerful influence so that we can come to an agreement with Ukraine, although contacts between us at the moment are good.

Fifth: We have extended the moratorium on nuclear tests to the middle of next year. This already was in existence, but there was no trust, and this moratorium was not supported by other states. Today, it has been supported by France and it has been supported by the United States. In the future, we three nuclear states—if the process proceeds in this way—will be able to halt nuclear weapons tests altogether. It is not logical to destroy them while at the same time carrying out tests. There is no logic in that process.

Ukraine Seeks 'Compensation' for START Ratification

*AU1311200792 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 11 Nov 92*

[News conference by President Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk with foreign and domestic reporters in Kiev on 10 November—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Moderator] [Words indistinct] we are beginning a news conference by Ukraine President Leonid Makarovych Kravchuk. As is common practice, questions will be asked using the microphones. We will start with the questions right away.

[Kravchuk] I only want to say one thing on the subject. Significant events have recently taken place in the internal and external political life of our state. The government has changed, and an animated discussion of Ukraine's draft constitution is in progress. There are talks and discussions around this, or rather, these problems. I am convinced that everyone of you has answers to the questions you are going to ask me, but, as I understand it, you want to know my answers. Therefore, I will give my answers, and you will ask your questions. Please start. [passage omitted]

[Name indistinct] Mr. President, at his first news conference, First Vice Premier Ihor Yukhnovskyy said that we will sell nuclear charges left after our missiles are dismantled to the highest bidder. On almost the very next day, the U.S. State Department told our ambassador in the United States that the United States would give Ukraine as much money as it needs to complete its nuclear disarmament. How do you assess this information?

[Kravchuk] To begin with, I assess information only after it is received at the government or state level and is signed by corresponding officials who do not only speak but also give orders regarding dollars. That is why if there is such a signature I will consider this with understanding and even with such a responsible formulation of this question, because this is realistic for Ukraine.

Ukraine has already transferred all of its tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, but so far we have had absolutely no

compensation, and we cannot go on this way. When we transfer these weapons—this takes labor and money—we must be compensated accordingly. This is all the more so since we need fuel for our nuclear power plants and reactors. These generate enormous expenses.

That is why we must consider all of this proceeding from civilized contractual principles. In order to get START ratified, we must present to the Supreme Soviet corresponding proposals that, in return for disarmament, Ukraine will receive material compensation and be provided with certain guarantees for its national security. If these two arguments are placed before Supreme Soviet deputies, I am sure they will vote for this treaty. [passage omitted]

[REUTER reporter] I ask you to specify one point regarding nuclear weapons: Who should compensate Ukraine for the removal of the weapons? Does your statement to the effect that the Supreme Soviet must discuss the ratification of START mean that Ukraine will not ratify START until it receives material compensation for withdrawing the weapons?

[Kravchuk] [passage omitted] I do not think that it is necessary to link the ratification of START, more accurately, of START by our parliament, to those conditions—they are quite numerous. I only want to say that it will be important for us, the president, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense, for all of us who are responsible for this treaty and its implementation, to appear before the Supreme Soviet and say that we will have specific conditions and guarantees if we ratify this treaty. This will speed up the voting and ratification, but this does not in any way mean that we will not submit this document to the Supreme Soviet. Incidentally, it is already there. Consequently, I want you to understand that I insisted and continue to insist on one thing: The treaty must be ratified and Ukraine cannot change the political course that it has adopted, including that in the sphere of armament, disarmament, and so on. We are only talking about amending conditions that would promote the implementation of this document. This is one. Two, we are, indeed, responsible to the world for this, but we are also responsible to our own people and to our own state for its national security. [passage omitted]

[UKRAYINA MOLODA reporter] Esteemed Leonid Makarovych, if we are to believe statistics from the Cabinet of Ministers, 25% of our industrial output for the first half of the current year is virtually outdated. Exportable [word indistinct] is (?about 0.4%) and the [word indistinct] products that can be sold for foreign currency account for just 1.1%. In this connection, I have a question: What specifically did China find of interest in Ukraine and Ukraine in China? This also applies to Mongolia. How is the president going to deal with the situation? Thank you.

[Kravchuk] [passage omitted] What have we found of interest in China? The political problem is that we want to establish our presence and policy in Asia-Pacific basin. Ukraine is a European power, a great power, and it cannot afford not to establish its presence in that region. This is first.

Second, we would like, and we said so, to see that region as a zone of peace and quiet. I believe that Ukraine and other

states that also pursue the policy of peace and of destruction of their nuclear weapons will, in the future, also influence the adoption of corresponding political decisions by states in that region. [passage omitted]

Kokoshin Views Missile Forces Future on Visit to Rezhitsa Base

Sees 'Great Solution'

*OW1211143292 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1402 GMT 12 Nov 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] While visiting the Rezhitsa rocket division, Andrey Kokoshin, the first deputy Russian Defense Minister, declared to journalists on Wednesday that Russia was standing on the threshold of great solution on strategic nuclear forces. He drew attention to the fact that at present these forces were assessed not only from the point of view of their combat efficiency but from the point of view of nuclear safety and security during exploitation and viability in case of an attack.

The Russian commander also pointed out that Russia was able to do everything necessary to maintain its strategic nuclear forces but it did not intend to refuse from the cooperation with the other CIS countries in their production. [sentence as received]

Russia and the United States are far away from the minimum level of nuclear deterrence, the deputy minister reminded. According to Kokoshin, the limit of the disarmament foresees inadmissibility of an attack destroying the retaliation forces. For the time being, it is necessary to proportionally reduce nuclear arsenals watching attentively for one another.

Seeks To 'Define Nuances'

*PM1311144892 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino
Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT
12 Nov 92*

[Report by Aleksandr Ukhov in Novgorod Oblast; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] We often speak of a nuclear shield as if forgetting that we also have a nuclear sword. Here, in the boundless forests at the junction of Novgorod, Tver, and Leningrad Oblasts, is the edge of that sword—the permanently installed and mobile missiles of the Rezhitsa division. For example, from here the SR-16 missile can strike virtually any target on our planet. Having taken off from this silo it will find its target at a distance of almost 11,000 kilometers. There is constant combat duty at the command point—in order to get there one first has to go through a tunnel for a long time and then go down by elevator for almost one and a half minutes. It is only a matter of seconds from the moment the system has been activated to the moment when the missile is launched—even less time than this report will last. At present, in line with international accords, missiles of the SR-16 type and others will be eliminated in the Rezhitsa division together with their silos. Instead, it is planned to transfer here from Belarus, which has declared itself a nuclear-free power, mobile missiles of the "Topol" type, or, as they are sometimes also

called, the SS-25. Russian strategic missile troops are beginning their modernization. That was the topic of my conversation with the division's officers.

[Begin recording] [Ukhov] What is the fundamental difference between Russian strategic nuclear forces and the strategic nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union?

[Kokoshin, first deputy defense minister] Well, of course they will be reduced considerably. There will be a new correlation between the various components of the strategic nuclear forces. One of the tasks of our trip was in fact defining many important nuances which will help us to rectify the development plans and make more rational use of the funds allocated to us from the budget and which are in fact part of the defense burden being borne by the whole people. [end recording]

'Important Decisions,' Further Reductions Foreseen

*PM1211163692 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 1*

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Russian Army Begins Modernization of Its Strategic Nuclear Forces"]

[Text] "We are on the brink of the adoption of very important decisions on the strategic nuclear forces," Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin stated in an interview for IZVESTIYA during his visit to the Guards Rezhitsa Red Banner Missile Division of the Strategic Missile Forces, stationed in the European part of Russia, in Valday.

"The START Treaty has been ratified. Further reductions in the strategic forces lie ahead, and the entire system of the country's defense capability is being reviewed," he said. "We are trying to formulate a new strategy for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces as the basis of our security and to define projects and avenues of research and experimental and design work."

The Moscow guests, who also included Aleksandr Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security, visited the missile division's new mobile command center; went down 40 meters deep into the concrete silo of a regimental command center to call on the duty crews; familiarized themselves with the system with which the formation is equipped; and met and talked with residents of the Bologoye garrison and officers of the unit.

The Defense Ministry leadership also had other reasons to visit the division. "Sotka," the MR-UR-100 missile system that the unit has had in place since 1979 (in an appendix to the START Treaty it is designated by the U.S. terminology as SS-17, and by Russian terminology as RS-16), is to be removed from the armory in the next two years.

The last few hundred of these missiles, especially those with multiple warheads, exist only in the European part of Russia. They come under the START Treaty and will be eliminated. They are to be replaced by the "Topol" (or SS-25) mobile missile system, a division of which is being withdrawn from Belarus. Orders for this system have also been placed with the Russian defense industry for 1993.

But in future the strategic nuclear forces are to have a fundamentally new, standardized missile of the next generation.

The composition of the Strategic Missile Forces, our experts claim, will be drastically reduced. But structurally it is proposed that they will combine mobile and stationary systems of high nuclear safety and reliability, efficient in use and cheap to manufacture, which comply fully with the various international agreements and treaties.

In strengthening its security Russia will continue to rely on the strength and might of the Strategic Missile Forces, Andrey Kokoshin told me. Incidentally, experts say that the missile forces are the cheapest branch of the Armed Forces. They are capable of tackling 60-100 percent of strategic combat tasks, yet require only 5-6 percent of the total defense budget. And 7 percent of that goes to the personnel's pay, 9 percent to capital construction, and 4 percent to research, design, and experimental work.

In connection with the redeployment of the missile division from Belarus to Valday, Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces, said it is planned to launch housing construction in the Vologoye garrison in 1993. Funds have already been allocated for this and surveys have been carried out. The missile regiments will be withdrawn and changed over not all at once, but gradually, two units a year, and will be provided with apartments and the necessary infrastructure.

The construction of emplacements for the Topols, the commander in chief noted, will be fairly cheap—they do not have to be dug into the ground, and the infrastructure of the MR-UR-100 is almost entirely suitable for them.

'Nuclear Shield' To Remain

PM1311215192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Nov 92 p 1

[Report by Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Mamchur and Major Aleksandr Dolinin: "Russia Will Keep Its Nuclear Shield. And It Will Be Reliable Enough"]

[Text] "A turning point has been reached in the development of our strategic nuclear forces. Work is being done to seek their optimum composition and structure," Andrey Kokoshin, Russian Federation first deputy defense minister, declared during a visit to the Rezhitsa Red Banner Guards' Division of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The breakup of the USSR and the emergence of a number of independent states have led not only to the dismemberment of the nuclear deterrent force but also to the breaking off of many collaborative ties in industry relating to the production of arms and military hardware. The economic crisis and the sharp drop in defense spending in 1992 are putting missilemen in still more difficult conditions. In addition, new international accords are coming into force with respect to nuclear weapons—the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms and the framework agreements. All this is happening with Russia in a new geopolitical position and in a changed international and military-political situation.

"These facts demand an in-depth revision of many previous approaches and a careful assessment of all our

resources—both technical and economic," Kokoshin said. "We are standing on the threshold of major decisions with regard to precisely which systems we will adopt, which ones we will develop and modernize further, and which ones we will eliminate. To this end a series of meetings has been held with general designers of missile hardware and employees of a number of leading scientific research institutes. Now we have come to this division, where we wanted to ascertain for ourselves a whole number of important nuances."

The Rezhitsa Division was certainly not chosen by chance. It reflects the present state of the Strategic Rocket Forces—the basis of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Some regiments are performing combat duty, others are disarming and participating in elimination measures. Experiments to extract the launch silos by means of a directed explosion have been conducted successfully on the basis of just this combined unit—about which our newspaper has already written.

On the whole, the combat collective is living in expectation of changes, new hardware, and a new staff-organizational structure. What will happen to the division in the next two or three years? The "hundreds," as the MR UR-100 missiles are customarily called, will gradually be replaced by RS-12M's—the so-called Topols based on mobile launchers—which is entirely in keeping with the policy of modernizing missile armaments. A significant role in the adoption of this decision was played by the fact that it is exponentially cheaper to put the Topols on combat duty than stationary complexes. This does not mean that the latter are being abandoned altogether: In time the optimum combination of both will be found.

During the work, the meetings, and the talks, the missilemen described and showed to those present—including a large group of journalists, maybe for the first time—much of what had previously been kept under seven seals, as the saying goes, including a mobile alternate command post and a launch silo. The first deputy defense minister and the commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces also visited the secret compartment where the first and second members of the command post's combat crew "keep their finger on the button"—perform intensive, continuous duty, in a constant waiting regime.

Much has been written and spoken about the incredible responsibility and the nervous and physical loads which fall to the lot of missilemen. Alas, as Major General A. Gribov, the division commander, said, they have recently increased still further. Units are as much as 25-percent undermanned in terms of soldiers and sergeants. As everywhere, there is a shortage of housing, and galloping prices hit at officers' empty pockets. Despite all this, missilemen still set an example of professionalism, competence, and selfless fulfillment of military duty. Kokoshin also pointed this out after meeting with the division's officers.

Among the complex and frequently pointed questions addressed to the first deputy defense minister, to A. Piskunov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee, and to Colonel Gen. I. Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, there was this one: Will "whole-sale" conversion not affect the interests of the troops?

combat readiness? What is seen as a sensible limit on the reduction of strategic offensive arms?

We believe that these questions are of concern not only to missilemen but also to all Russians who are not indifferent about the homeland's destiny.

The chief criterion for the extent of the reduction of strategic offensive arms is the availability of the quantity and quality of nuclear means that will not leave any side with even the hypothetical possibility of making a preemptive strike that cannot be answered, Kokoshin pointed out. As regards the pace of the reduction, it must correspond to the actual state of the nuclear deterrent force and to the country's economic potential. For the purpose of selecting the optimum path an in-depth comparative analysis is being made of all options for the development of the strategic nuclear forces. Account has to be taken of the fact that their existing model has to a considerable extent exhausted itself, and many arms systems have virtually ended their life cycle. Policy in the sphere of research and development is determined on this basis.

In any case there is to be a sharp reduction in the number of types of missiles—which will considerably simplify their operation. One of the chief priorities will be the development of a battle management and communications system. The enhancement of their reliability and operational efficiency is far more effective and economically advantageous than the creation of new means of destruction. Considerable attention will also be devoted to enhancing the protection of launchers and other vitally important facilities against acts of terrorism.

Despite the destruction of collaborative ties caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian industry is capable of producing everything necessary for the nuclear deterrent force, the first deputy defense minister emphasized. This does not mean, however, that we are abandoning cooperation with other CIS states when this meets the interests of Russia's security and mutual interests. The Strategic Rocket Forces grouping and our nuclear forces as a whole will be developed with due regard for our international obligations. But above all, of course, the interests of strategic stability will be taken into account.

Bush Visit Canceled; START Treaty Not Ready

*PM1311113392 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 4*

[Report by Aleksandr Shalnev: "President Bush Will Not Come to Moscow"]

[Text] Washington—Without excessive fuss and almost without attracting any press attention, U.S. President George Bush canceled what could have been one of the most major events of the end of his presidency—an official visit to Russia.

An understanding that this visit would take place before the end of the year was reached between Bush and President Boris Yeltsin during their June summit meeting in Washington. On arriving in Moscow, the plan was for Bush to sign a treaty on radically reducing strategic offensive weapons (START-2), which had basically been agreed at the same meeting in Washington. This fact alone would

have given the visit historical significance, since the proposed cuts would have been historically unprecedented.

But now there is to be no visit, nor will there be a treaty—at least during Bush's Presidency. According to reports from informed sources, the clear understanding that START-2 will not be ready in the foreseeable future was one reason why the summit meeting in Moscow was abandoned. What, essentially, was the U.S. President to do in Moscow without a START treaty to sign? And then: G. Bush, a man who is proud to the point of snobbishness, seems unable to entertain the thought that on this trip he would have to play the role of President, while at the back of his mind there would always be the thought that Bill Clinton is the real, genuine, although not yet inaugurated, president.

According to available information, the issue of the trip was examined by Bush in a private discussion with General Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, immediately after the election, and it was precisely on the recommendation of Scowcroft, who, I think, simply articulated what Bush himself was thinking, that it was decided that there would be no visit.

On Tuesday well-informed sources confirmed that the visit would indeed not be taking place and no preparations are being made for it either in the State Department or in the White House, which, let me note, has switched to a slack and completely untypical work schedule—probably preparing itself for the appearance of new figures there.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Cheap Sale of Laser Technology to West Hit

*PM1611145192 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 11 Nov 92 p 4*

[Roza Sergaziyeva article:: "Someone Loses. But Who Gains?"]

[Text] Russian academic institutions have offered unique laser technology for next to nothing to the Livermore Laboratory in the United States which works on the SDI program.

I congratulate you, we have once more distinguished ourselves by discovering a new law of nature. It is not only liquids which display a capacity for fluxion but also the... "minds" of people in this country. And what is more, they only flow in one direction, strictly Westwards. At first it was the nuclear physicists who submitted themselves to this new law. Now here is another sensation which has shaken the world—some 15 Russian academic institutions have concluded a contract with the Livermore Laboratory which does not take in washing back in the United States but works on the SDI program. We have handed our laser technology on a plate to the resourceful Americans.

The people at Livermore knew what to buy: lasers as well as space technology—that rare area of science in which we continue to occupy the leading position in the world. But it was not just the fact of the contracts being concluded which stunned the experts, but the value our academicians put on their truly world-class labor. For example, one of the contracts offers to pay the physicists \$25,000 for seven reports. Our specialists, as well as our "competitors" from

France, Japan, and other U.S. firms which would themselves not be averse to buying such work, estimate that one of these reports—which contains a list of the basic experiments on the subject, their results, and a prognosis for the future—is 200 pages long, and could attract, well, no less than \$200,000-250,000. Clearly, there are reports and reports, but the country has nevertheless, according to various estimations, lost no less than \$1 million on this deal.

"In its time the government invested billions of rubles in this work. And our unfortunate scientists went out onto the market and offered their "golden egg" to the first person who came along without having carried out proper marketing," Yuriy Kruzhilin, deputy director of the "Astrofizika" scientific-production association, says, not hiding his annoyance; he is one of the few whom the Livermore Laboratory did not succeed in persuading to accept a contract for mere pennies and in whom the Americans found a worthy partner who knows how to sell what he possesses. "I really think that the sum of \$15,000, which the purchasers offered for our report, was mechanically converted into rubles, which would have suited the Americans, but, of course, did not suit us. But we are not rejecting future cooperation and we nevertheless intend to obtain a contract from the Livermore people, but for no less than \$100,000. It will include an outline project of a laser installation for common development.

Yes, our academicians have gotten themselves into this position. But I want to put in a word for them. They told what life is like for them now at a recent rally in Moscow. The quantity of research topics is being reduced and there will be significant unemployment of staffers. Finance for research, especially basic research, is being reduced until it hurts. The material position of the institutions, research workers, and those in possession of the "know-how" is unenviable. In addition public attitudes have changed direction. The prestige of theoretical and book work has fallen and the science departments in many major publishing houses have closed. I have had occasion to talk to many of our scientists. I am not going to pull any punches. It is the opportunity to throw off the burden of everyday problems which is attracting them to the West. But this, nevertheless, is not what is most important. There they can get (if, of course, they are lucky) better working conditions, and the necessary apparatus. The most important thing is that once they are being approached and offered contracts, this means that they are needed. Their work is necessary. "Surely there are no purchasers for our ideas in a country where production is falling and people doff their caps to those who own a private stall?"

"But there are purchasers in the country itself. At the moment the international scientific industrial corporation "Laser Systems" is being formed. The laser scientists' future developments will be purchased through this corporation as well. For a decent market price. The partnership may turn out to be reliable. On the one hand there are the scientists who understand their work's scientific potential perfectly. On the other hand, the industrialists know the economic effect this or that development promises to have, and consequently its real worth. The larger the range of offers, the more promising the mechanism for competition will be. But this does not mean at all that the

industrialists will buy up absolutely everything, and resell it on the world market. We are talking about more advanced types of participation for industrial capital. The finished product will be turned out on the basis of the new technologies and offered to the market. In this way the country will earn much more. But by selling advanced technology for a song—when the academicians will earn \$25,000-30,000—one hole will be patched over today, and tomorrow they will once more go to a rally to demand state subsidies.

So, the industrialists are offering to save the day for the scientists, specifically offering the laser scientists the scientific and industrial corporation "Laser Systems." But this, after all, is but one area of scientific work; the laser researchers are changing their minds, but what about the biologists, chemists, and nuclear scientists? But, as the industrialists see the situation, the "Laser Systems" corporation is only a model, on whose basis, it is proposed, the government should perfect a mechanism for resolving this painful problem in other sectors as well.

The recent example of selling laser technology (specifically technology and not the finished product, as people are able to do in the advanced countries) for a song is depressing. What could be an earner, or as one of the people I talked to recently described it, "our intellectual oil," is disappearing to the West. Let us be realistic, this process will increase. Such is the economic situation in the country and such are the deficiencies of budgetary finance which simply cannot be gotten from anywhere. Therefore the adaptability of our industrialists who are showing genuine interest in science not only for altruistic reasons but for market-led economic ones as well, gives cause for optimism. They are ready to invest in science. One small thing I should add: The plan for this work has been approved at the level of the government's first deputy chairman, Vladimir Shumeyko, and an instruction has been given to prepare a government directive. And the sooner the better. As Yuriy Kruzhilin rightly said: "We are talking about days and weeks. We could be too late."

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Belarus Ratifies CFE Treaty

Text of Ratification Decree

WS2011133492 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA
in Belarusian 28 Oct 92 p 1

["Belarusian Supreme Council Decree on Ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Europe from 19 November, 1990 and the Agreement on Principles and Order of Accomplishment of the Treaty from 15 May, 1992," signed by Supreme Council Chairman S. Shushkevich in Minsk on 21 October 1992]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus decrees:

1. To ratify the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Europe [CFE] from 19 November, 1990 together with the following protocols:

- on the existing types of the conventional arms and materiel;

- on the procedures regulating reclassification of specific models or variants of battle training aircraft into non-battle training aircraft;
- on procedures regulating reduction of the conventional arms and materiel that are limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;
- on procedures regulating the classification of battle helicopters and reclassification of multipurpose attack helicopters;
- on the exchange of information with a supplement;
- on inspection;
- on a joint consultative group;
- on the temporary use of some statutes of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Europe.

2. To ratify the Agreement on Principles and Order of Accomplishment of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Europe from 15 May, 1992, together with the following protocols:

- on the maximum levels of the conventional weapons and materiel available in the Republic of Azerbaijan, in the Republic of Armenia, in the Republic of Belarus, in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in the Republic of Moldova, in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Republic of Georgia, in connection with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces Europe;
- on the conventional arms and materiel in the categories that are limited by the Treaty and are included in the Coast Guard, Marines, and strategic missile troops;
- on tank bridge-layers in regular troops;
- on battle helicopters MI-24p and MI-24k that are not subjected to restrictions on battle helicopters.

3. To charge the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus to carry out the necessary measures in order to fulfill this decree.

[Signed] S. SHUSHKEVICH, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus
21 October 1992
Minsk
N 1884-XII.

Report on Reduction Plans

PM1111094992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Nov 92 p 2

[Valeriy Kovalev report: "Belarus Will Not Be an Arms Exporter, Although Even After Fulfillment of CFE Treaty It Will Be Left with 1,600 Tanks, 200 Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers, and 130 Aircraft"]

[Text] It is known that on 21 October the Belarusian parliament ratified the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. Belarus—previously one of the countries on the European continent most saturated with troops (not of its own will, of course)—is about to reduce the arms it inherited from the former Belarusian Military District.

The republic has been allocated 40 months for this. Not so little time, you might think! But judge for yourselves how much has to be done. Here are the data that Major General Viktor Vakar, chief of the Belarusian Control and Inspections Agency under the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Defense, cited for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: More than 1,600 tanks, 130 combat aircraft, and more than 1,200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers are subject to reduction. According to specialists' estimates, the cost of this "operation" will total approximately 500 million rubles.

The tank repair plant in Borisov is already practically ready to "disarm" and convert some of the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles for use in the national economy. The aircraft repair plant in Baranovichi will dismantle aircraft, and the special base at Stankovo—armored personnel carriers. The bodies of armored hardware subject to destruction will be melted down at Zhlobin Metallurgical Plant.

The elimination of combat hardware is expected to give Belarus approximately 50,000 tonnes of high-grade metal. Mindful of this fact, as well as the fact that it is planned to use some of the components, units, and mechanisms for civilian purposes, many specialists with whom I have spoken arrive at the conclusion that the republic is capable of not only covering its own expenditure on arms reduction but also making some profit.

It is interesting that during the discussion of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe a number of deputies proposed replenishing the treasury more "solidly." For this, in the opinion of some parliamentarians, part of the combat hardware ought not to be destroyed but... sold abroad. The proposal, however, did not meet with support in the Supreme Soviet. Of course, it would be nice to sell it, but the treaty does not permit the sale to other countries of arms being reduced. They are liable to mandatory elimination or conversion for use for civilian purposes.

Maj. Gen. Viktor Vakar confirmed the readiness of Belarus to fulfill its commitments to the other parties to the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe in full and within the times strictly allocated for this. The remaining arms are another matter. The republic has the right to dispose of them at its own discretion. It will have on a legal basis 1,600 modern tanks, 200 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 130 aircraft, and a considerable number of artillery systems and helicopters. But, according to forecasts by the Republic of Belarus Ministry of Defense, the republic will refrain from selling surplus weapons.

First, I was told, prestige, the respect of other states, and the desire for neutrality and peaceableness—a desire declared at the highest level—are dearer to it than money. Second, this combat hardware, even if mothballed on bases and in storehouses, will remain for a further five, six, or even more years at the level of the highest demands and will meet the needs of the republic's young army. So Belarus will hardly become a major arms exporter.

Incidentally, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has learned that a schedule for the withdrawal of strategic nuclear missiles to Russia from the republic's territory has been drawn up and approved in accordance with a directive by Belarusian

Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich. By agreement with the Russian Federation leadership it is planned to withdraw combat hardware and 81 ICBM's from Belarus over two years. Eight missile brigades will leave Belarus in 1993 and the same number in 1994. It is intended that Belarus will be nuclear-free by 30 December 1994.

Reports, Comments on Russian Withdrawal From Baltics

Russian Officer, Latvian Official on Pullout Halt

93UM0142A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Nov 92 p 3

[Interview with Lt Gen Fedor Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, and Georgs Stiprais, chief of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, by Col Vadim Solovyev under the rubric "A Problem": "The Withdrawal of Russian Troops From the Baltic Area: Two Views on a Single Issue"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic area is taking on a more and more dramatic tinge by the day. Russian President Boris Yeltsin recently ordered the suspension of the troop withdrawal, claiming wholesale violations of the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries. At the same time the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] has explained through Deputy Minister Anatoliy Churkin that the suspension has nothing to do with any other issue.

The situation is becoming more and more confusing by the day. We continue to devote a great deal of attention to the withdrawal of the troops from the Baltic area and today we are publishing the opinion of the two parties obviously most concerned: the command element of Russian troops in the Baltic area (headquartered in Riga) and the military leadership of one of the Baltic countries, Lithuania.

Evaluating the situation surrounding the Russian troops in the Baltic countries, Lt Gen Fedor Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, commented that he could not say the job was bringing a great deal of satisfaction but that duty requires him to perform it conscientiously. The morale of the officers and warrant officers is alarming, and this is affecting also the enlisted personnel. It is caused mainly by the uncertainty and the unplanned nature of our work. The military are not accustomed to working without a plan, although we do understand all of the political issues to one extent or another. I will frankly say that this is disturbing those of us in charge. We began by scheduling the withdrawal for 1998, then moved it up to 1997, then 1996. We have now lost even these guidelines. The troop withdrawal is being carried out to the extent that it is possible, however.

[Solovyev] How many troops have already been withdrawn?

[Melnichuk] Around 40 percent have been withdrawn from all the republics within a brief period of time.

[Solovyev] But what about recent instructions to suspend the withdrawal for those going to areas without housing?

[Melnichuk] We take them as a demand that the work be stepped up in the new areas where the troops will be stationed. We have had some experience in removing troops to new locations, only to find nothing or almost nothing built there. While there are some facilities for housing the equipment and the personnel, practically nothing has been built to accommodate the officers' families—only barracks at best. I am not even talking about schools and children's facilities. This is an enormous problem. One can also empathize with the local authorities in one of the rayons in Leningrad Oblast, who have found themselves with 300 school children of servicemen. For the local authorities—no one warned them—this was like having snow dumped on them in the middle of summer.

Housing is our most acute problem. In Lithuania the situation is clear. An officer sells an apartment there and is able to buy an apartment in Russia with the money he receives. In Latvia and Estonia a decision was adopted—and the reasons are clear—to declare all of our apartments to be service apartments, including those in which retired military personnel are living. Housing is being nationalized. How can this be, when the money for housing construction has recently been taken from the treasury of the Ministry of Defense? And the worst thing is that when officers and warrant officers are replaced, it is absolutely forbidden to move the new arrivals into their housing.

[Solovyev] And what are the command element and the Ministry of Defense doing about this?

[Melnichuk] We have been authorized by the Russian government to sell written-off and obsolete equipment. We have the proceeds from this. Most of them are going for the purchase of apartments in Russia. Today we need 1,870 apartments just for those who are being released from the military service, and also for other categories of military personnel. At the present time we have paid for 543 apartments. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has allocated 78 million rubles for the purchase of apartments for our servicemen. We are alarmed by the fact that while six months ago a square meter of housing cost 15,000 rubles, the cost has now gone up to 27,000-32,000. We can still acquire housing in the rural area for 17,000. This means that the number of apartments which can be purchased with the allocated funds is being cut in half.

[Solovyev] Let us get back to the situation of the military personnel here in the Baltic countries. Their financial situation, for example.

[Melnichuk] Let people denounce me for this, but I can say that it was easier for us in the military to exchange rubles for local currency a couple of months ago than it is now. Some sort of dirty trick is being played. In Latvia the ruble's rate was previously 0.6, then 0.5, and it is now 0.45. And that is not the bottom. Not long ago we were issuing half of the officers' pay in local money. Only a third is in local money today. Due to the exchange rate the officer actually receives 3,000 rubles instead of the 7,000 due him. The Russian government is trying to help. Not long ago Prime Minister Gaydar was personally dealing with this matter. We are still not getting the help which should have been forthcoming, however.

[Solovyev] What are relations with the local population like?

[Melnichuk] The anti-army propaganda supported by the leaders of some republics is a great impediment. It is stepped up mainly during various election campaigns. Most of the population of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia treat the Russian troops all right, though. Youth between the ages of 18 and 22 are the most negative, and they account for most of the protestors.

[Solovyev] From Moscow one has the impression that there is an insurmountable wall between the Russian command element in the Baltic area and the local authorities. Is that so?

[Melnichuk] It is possible to work with all the Baltic republics and their leaders. And we are. Our working relations are best with the government of the Lithuanian Republic. Nor can one say that the leaders of Latvia and Estonia are doing nothing. They are meeting us halfway. We are resolving such issues as the provision of food, water and heat, and other basic matters fairly well on the basis of reciprocal agreements at the local level. It is only natural that more troops have been withdrawn today from Lithuania, where they are doing more to meet us halfway, than from Latvia or Estonia.

The greatest difficulty in our work stems from the fact that laws are passed unilaterally by the leaders of Latvia and Estonia, without coordinating them with the Russian military. In private conversations, however, it is acknowledged that this is not legal. Those with whom I have confidential relations admit: "Fedor Ivanovich, we are deliberately trying to make it intolerable for you." We did not hear this sort of thing in the past, but we are hearing it more and more frequently today.

[Solovyev] You have served a fairly long time in these parts and should know the local conditions and the people well. In your opinion, how should all the problems be resolved?

[Melnichuk] Since we are building a democratic state, we need to do things by agreement. It is my opinion that it is better to work things out by agreement than through confrontation.

[Solovyev] When do you think the last Russian soldier will be able to leave the Baltic area?

[Melnichuk] It is for the Ministry of Defense to decide when the last soldier leaves the Baltic countries, of course. I would consider it an honor to leave with him. I would like for this to occur sometime around 1996.

Georgs Stiprais, chief of the Planning Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, does not conceal the fact that he regards the Russian troops as troops of a foreign state, which must be removed as rapidly as possible. Latvia's parliament has decided that this should occur within a year, by the beginning of fall, 1993.

[Solovyev] The Latvian parliament made this absolute decision without coordinating it with the Russian side.

[Stiprais] The schedule has indeed not yet been coordinated. We know that Russia had proposed completing the troop withdrawal during the period 1997-1999. Russia's position then changed suddenly, and it agreed to withdraw the troops by 1994. Mutual understanding has not been reached on this matter. It would be difficult to say what the prospects are, but I hope that a mutually acceptable

decision can be found, since Russia accepted that commitment at the Conference on Security and Cooperation.

[Solovyev] The troop withdrawal is linked to human rights violations in the Baltic countries.

[Stiprais] I do not think it is valid to link the two issues: troop withdrawal and human rights. In our opinion, the question of the observance of human rights is a concocted one, and if there are some problems in this respect, they should be resolved separately. The matter of the withdrawal should be decided independently of other issues.

[Solovyev] But what about the rights of retired personnel in Latvia, for example?

[Stiprais] These are common problems, regardless of whether the people are under the Russian Ministry of Defense or the Latvian state. The question is whether their minimum pension is enough for survival. We feel that the Russian state should take care of pensioners of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR, since it is Russia which has declared itself the heir to the former Soviet Union. This status involves not only advantages, but obligations as well. And it is very important that Russia conduct an unequivocal policy.

[Solovyev] What are your relations with the local Russian command element like?

[Stiprais] I feel that it is easier to find a common language here than at the general state level, at which a mutually acceptable solution has not been found.

[Solovyev] And what, in your opinion, is preventing this?

[Stiprais] The main thing is to have equal partners at the negotiating table. If one party feels that it has the right to talk down to the smaller one, probably nothing will come of it. Just how did little Latvia dare to make demands of Russia, for example, or does Russia have some sort of strategic interests in the Baltic area, including Latvia, even though Latvia has no strategic interests in Russia? Where is the equality of the partners at the negotiating table?

[Solovyev] The opinion persists that the troop withdrawal is being retarded by a disinclination on the part of Latvia to create normal living conditions for the families of officers and warrant officers departing your area. The best possible solution has been found for those remaining in Latvia, after all.

[Stiprais] The decisions should be fairly constructive in principle. There has been a lot of talk about the construction of housing for the departing troops. Unfortunately, Russia is dragging its feet in indicating the sites where apartment buildings or housing complexes could be built. A number of Western states are prepared to finance the construction of housing for Russian officers and warrant officers. Latvia is prepared to supply the work force, of which it has a surplus, for the construction. We have waited a long time for Russia's response, however. The people are ultimately the victims.

Latvian Chairman on Yeltsin Letter

LD0811044892 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
2100 GMT 6 Nov 92

[Text] [Supreme Council Chairman] Anatolijs Gorbunovs on Friday afternoon received an official letter from Boris Yeltsin, which he read briefly at a news conference:

[Begin Gorbunovs recording] The essence is the following: Russia without any ambiguity asserts her wish to withdraw Russian troops from Latvia. But we want to secure the normal functioning of these troops while they are being withdrawn, to secure social and legal protection for soldiers, pensioners, and members of their families. Unfortunately, this has not been done yet, and we are forced, therefore, to resort to the curtailment [of the troop withdrawal] for some time. An agreement on the troop withdrawal will have to be concluded while they are stationed on Latvian territory for the time being. Russia is ready to discuss all these issues with the Latvian side and views optimistically its future relations with Latvia, but at the same time notes that the rights of Russian-speaking people—it is mentioned here—in Latvia will be the focus of Russia's attention, and Russia will in the future defend these interests and will turn with these issues to all social and political institutions of the world. [end recording]

Briefly commenting on this letter, Mr. Gorbunovs referred to it as being rather strange because, according to him, one could think from reading it that there had not been any order by Boris Yeltsin before that.

Baltic Council Urges Unconditional Pullout

OW0711040892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1745 GMT 6 Nov 92

[From the "Presidential Bulletin"; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Baltic Council at its conference in Vilnius Thursday called on the Russian Government to complete the withdrawal of its troops from the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania without any delay not later than the summer of 1993. The heads of the three Baltic countries voiced their opposition to Russia's attempts to continue its presence on their territories after that time. They expressed hope that as a UN Security Council member, the Russian Federation will abstain from any actions incompatible with the objectives of the UN and leading to an escalation of tension and instability in the Baltic region and Northern Europe.

Vytautas Landsbergis, Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Lennart Meri have addressed their appeal in that regard to the heads of the CSCE member states, the UN, NATO and EC secretary generals, the chairmen of the European Parliament and Commission of European Communities, and the president of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The participants of the Baltic Council have expressed their serious concern over the decision by the Russian Government to suspend the withdrawal of the Russian troops from their territories. They emphasized that the troops withdrawal should not be associated with any political or socioeconomic commitments by any of the parties, moreover with economic relations among them. Therefore, the Baltic Council is declining Russia's attempts to relate the

withdrawal of the Russian troops to the alleged human rights violations in Latvia and Estonia.

The Baltic Council members argue that participation of third parties and international organizations in the process of talks and in observing over the implementation of the agreements after they have been reached would expedite the settlement of the issues associated with the Russian troops withdrawal.

Baltic Leaders Back Talks

WS1011130092 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1059 GMT 9 Nov 92

["Baltic States' Common Standpoint: Unconditional Russia's Troop Withdrawal"—ETA NEWS BULLETIN headline; from 7 November POSTIMEES p 1]

[Text] Monday, November 9—Leaders of the Baltic States Vytautas Landsbergis, Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Lennart Meri expressed their approval over Russia's president Yeltsin's suggestion to hold negotiations on the burning issue of troop withdrawal from the Baltic territory. All three presidents were content with the work and results of the Baltic States Council.

Estonia's President Lennart Meri told the news conference that Russian diplomats are not right when claiming that the Baltics have not agreed with Russia on tactical points—flexible tactics are always followed at negotiations. According to Meri, the aim of the Baltic States is to turn the Baltic Sea region into a peaceful part of earth which probably is the aim of Russia as well.

Further political cooperation of the Baltic States was discussed at the session. Meri stressed that development of economic relations will have to support the political cooperation.

Meri, Landsbergis and Gorbunovs signed an application to heads of CSCE states, NATO secretary general, CE [Council of Europe] secretary general, chairman of European parliament, head of the Commission of European Communities and president of the North Atlantic Assembly. They sent a letter to UNO Secretary General Butrus Butrus Ghali.

Lithuanian Charge in Moscow Comments

OW1111043092 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1646 GMT
10 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] There have been no applications from Russia within the established deadlines for the further withdrawal of troops from Lithuania. This is indirect evidence that the military are going to act on President Yeltsin's instruction suspending the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic states, Lithuania's charge d'affairs in Moscow Egidius Bickauskas has said.

He does not rule out contacts between Moscow and Vilnius in the near future, including those at the highest level, to discuss the question of troop withdrawal.

Bickauskas said it was not a great surprise for him to learn that President Yeltsin had ordered the suspension of the troop pullout, but added he was greatly upset by that

decision. Bickauskas said he was surprised by the fact that the presidential decision mentioned problems in effecting the pullout in wintertime. "This is all very strange, it may seem that the people who concluded the agreement on the pullout from Latvia in September did not know that winter would begin in Russia in a few months", Bickauskas said. The Lithuanian charge d'affaires said the "unilateral decision caused mistrust towards the reliability of one's partner".

Bickauskas dismissed any attempts to link the withdrawal with social guarantees for the servicemen being withdrawn from Lithuania. "We are not going to pay for this with our own money", he said. At the same time the diplomat said that Lithuania had asked third countries to try to help Russia in establishing a social safety net for the servicemen and received positive replies. "We are not saying we won't help Russia in that matter in the future, but we are strongly against this linkage", Bickauskas said. [passage omitted]

Russia's Churkin, Air Defense General Comment
MK1211090192 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 45-46 (Signed to press 10 Nov 92) p 11

[Grant Gukasov report: "For Internal Use"]

[Text] President Yeltsin's directive on suspending the halting of the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic was an "internal document"—that was how Vitaliy Churkin, Russian Federation deputy foreign minister, described the president's statement at a press conference devoted to the results of his visit to Estonia. According to Vitaliy Churkin, the directive was linked to the need to set the relevant Russian departments the task of resolving a whole range of socioeconomic issues connected with the troop withdrawal and the domestic political situation in Russia.

"All this has been quite unsuccessful," the Russian Federation deputy foreign minister summed up. "The directive was written in the language of an internal document. If the Russian Foreign Ministry had been involved at the drafting stage, it would have been worded differently."

"We are in a situation where the 'ball has been rolling' for a long time," MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's correspondent was told by Major General Ziyatdin Abdurakhmanov, who is in charge of all the remaining air defense units in the republic, "and it is simply impossible to halt the withdrawal process. Three air regiments and a helicopter squadron have left from my division. Ground services and equipment have been left behind. In a month's time we will have only 5 percent of the draftees we need [v stroyu budet pyat protsentov soldat srochnoy sluzhby]—so who will guard the remaining equipment? It'll all be stolen! It's hard to know just what the Russian president had in mind with this directive."

Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was in Ivangorod at the time, stated that the forthcoming Congress of Russian People's Deputies will adopt a decision to grant the Estonian-Russian border the status of a state border. To which Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste reasonably remarked: "The state border between neighboring countries is established solely on the basis of bilateral talks." Clearly, Khasbulatov's statement too was intended solely for domestic consumption.

Decision on Funding Troops in Estonia, Latvia

LD1111174492 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino
Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT
11 Nov 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian Government issued an instruction on the funding of Russian troops in the Baltic region as the Baltic republics are introducing their own national currencies. The plan is simple: Estonia and Latvia will pay for the Russian gas in their own currencies. The earnings will be channeled to the Army. The same deal may be arranged with Lithuania, as well. In addition, servicemen in the Baltic area will be given funds in convertible currency.

Russia Creates Troop Withdrawal Commission

PM1311114992 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 92 p 1

[Russian Federation Government Directive No. 2044-d issued by Acting Premier Ye. Gaydar in Moscow on 5 November]

[Text] 1. In accordance with the Russian Federation Security Council decision dated 4 November 1992, a working commission is to be formed under the Russian Federation Government to tackle all questions connected with the withdrawal of Russian troops and naval forces from the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, and the Republic of Estonia to Russian Federation territory, with the following membership:

V.F. Shumeyko, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government (chairman of the commission);

B.V. Gromov, Russian Federation deputy minister of defense (deputy chairman of the commission);

A.A. Astakhov, Russian Federation deputy minister of finance;

R.T. Aprelikov, director in charge of contracting orders for state needs of the "Roskontrakt" Federal Contracting Corporation;

I.S. Materov, Russian Federation deputy minister of the economy;

V.I. Churkin, Russian Federation deputy minister of foreign affairs.

2. The working commission is to ensure close collaboration with the organs of executive authority of Russian Federation republics, krais, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg on whose territory it is planned to station the military formations which are withdrawn.

3. The commission chairman is to ratify the statute on the commission.

[Signed] Yegor Gaydar

Russian NWGF Deputy Commander Interviewed

PM1111155592 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 11 Nov 92 p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant General F. Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces, by K. Markaryan in Riga; date not given: "Withdrawal of Troops From the Baltic. Gen. Melnichuk Does Not Rule Out Use of Weapons."]

[Text] This year has seen the commanding officer of the former Baltic Military District changed three times. Colonel General F. Kuzmin was removed for supporting the putschists; Colonel General V. Mironov was recalled to Moscow as first deputy defense minister; and Colonel General Mayorov is still getting used to the situation. But the problems of the Russian Army in the Baltics remain, despite Boris Yeltsin's recent directive suspending the withdrawal of troops. The following interview with Lieutenant General F. Melnichuk, first deputy commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces [NWGF], is about these problems.

[Markaryan] Fedor Ivanovich, back in early October the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies and Representatives of All Categories of Troops and All Branches of the Russian Army in the Baltics proposed that a moratorium be introduced on the withdrawal of troops from the Baltics. Does this mean that Moscow heeded this?

[Melnichuk] Undoubtedly, the Coordinating Council's statement played its part. But the decision on the moratorium was made when the activity of officers' assemblies was abolished by order of the minister of defense. Let me stress that the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries has not been halted, but suspended. At the same time, after talks at the intergovernmental level, the Russian side intended to begin withdrawing troops from the Baltics only after the withdrawal of the Western, Northern, and Southern Groups from other countries had been completed. But at the request of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian governments, we have nevertheless begun withdrawing subunits of the Northwestern Group of Forces also. At the same time we proposed that the Baltic countries offer us at least some help. But all the expenses once again fell on the shoulders of Russia, which finds it difficult on its own. Units are being withdrawn to places devoid of all facilities. In Leningrad Oblast, for example, half a barracks has been assigned to a whole brigade. And people have arrived with their families—there are 250 children alone. It is 50 km to the nearest school...

[Markaryan] So was this a withdrawal of troops or a flight?

[Voronin] No, it is not a flight. But if only we knew that there were at least some facilities ready in the new places. Help is needed in the construction of housing. But Latvia and Estonia categorically refuse this. Servicemen in Lithuania have at least been allowed to privatize their own apartments, so that they can sell them and acquire housing somewhere in Russia. My family, too, is facing a housing problem; you see, the Latvian Government has declared servicemen's apartments official property.

The position of the Latvian and Estonian sides is surprising. While advocating the soonest possible withdrawal of troops, they themselves are holding up this process by

forbidding the personnel of subunits to be replenished. We are left with fewer and fewer soldiers. In some units strength level is down to 36 percent. The last servicemen are to be demobilized in spring...

[Markaryan] Only officers will remain? And what about military equipment, shells, and mines which, according to the rules, are supposed to be loaded only by hand?

[Melnichuk] The officers corps will have to see to this. It will take us until the end of 1995 to cope with the loading work by our own efforts.

[Markaryan] Does all this mean that the Northwestern Group of Forces is no longer combat effective?

[Melnichuk] This must be partly admitted. We already find it difficult to perform the global operational tasks in the defense of the Western borders which we have been set.

[Markaryan] But other problems exist, too. The theft of weapons from military units and the seizure of military facilities are continuing. And after all, large arsenals are concentrated near Riga...

[Melnichuk] Yes, there are two large munitions storehouses in the Riga region. At the moment they are securely guarded: We have transferred additional forces there. But these storehouses are attracting increasing interest. The same people are being noticed along the outer fence—obviously they are studying the approaches to the arsenals...

The most terrible thing is the fact that, through the fault of some regional rulers, especially in Latvia and Estonia, various facilities are beginning to be seized. If the seizures go on, we will reach the point of having to use weapons. This is already becoming imminent, although we have been carrying out explanatory work among personnel in recent months. But sometimes simply humiliating situations arise.

How much can the patience of armed men be tested?

**Russia's Shumeyko Links Baltics, NATO
Withdrawals**

OW181114492 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1133 GMT 18 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries alters the politico-military balance in the world, Russia's First Deputy Premier Vladimir Shumeyko told BF [BALTFAX]'s correspondent on Wednesday [18 November]. According to him, in order to maintain politico-military parity Russian troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries should be followed by the withdrawal of NATO troops from other regions.

He will hold a working conference in the Defence Ministry on the issue of Russian troops withdrawal from the Baltic states on Wednesday, said V. Shumeyko. Discussions will involve "the politico-military, economic, social and moral aspects" of this process, he said.

The Deputy Premier believes that the proposed conference will result in drafting a plan for further actions connected

with troops withdrawal, which will be coordinated with Russia's Security Council and the President.

Progress of Russian-Lithuanian Ships for Housing Deal Viewed

93UM0142B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Valeriy Gromak: "Lithuania Will Build Housing for the Baltic Fleet If it Receives Several Ships in Exchange"]

[Text] We have long known that talks were underway between the command element of the Baltic Fleet and Lithuania's Ministry of National Defense on the construction of housing for military personnel. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has reported on this. Let us recall a few details, however.

At the beginning of September the Ostankino television company broadcast a report on a Kaliningrad press conference on an agreement between Lithuania's Selma association and the Baltic Fleet on the construction of housing for servicemen in Kaliningrad Oblast. Following the conference KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondence office was flooded with letters from military personnel. They all essentially asked the same question: When will we receive apartments in these buildings? As a result of the withdrawal of fleet forces from the Baltic countries and Poland the housing problem has become considerably more acute.

I want to say at the outset that the issue is still open, although a protocol of intent was signed in Vilnius at the beginning of last year on social and economic cooperation between the Baltic Fleet and the government of Lithuania. Based on this document the Latvian side expressed interest in a barter deal in which Lithuania would be sold several ships, items of equipment and weapons in exchange for building a housing development in Kaliningrad.

Army Gen Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, and Lithuania's Minister of National Defense Audrius Butkevicius met in Moscow in May of this year. Following the meeting orders were issued to sell the Lithuanian side two torpedo boats, two small ASW ships, a hydrographic vessel (mainly obsolete items) and a certain quantity of gear. It was planned to pay for the ships and equipment by building housing for personnel of the Baltic Fleet.

I was informed at Baltic Fleet headquarters that after the matter was cleared through Vladimir Shumayko, first deputy chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, the fleet's command element concluded a sale/purchase contract. The transaction was not consummated on the date set, 30 September, however, even though a representative of the Baltic Fleet had signed a bilateral document on the transfer of the ships on 25 September. What happened?

The time factor went into play, as they say. While all the talks were underway and the contracts were being signed, the government of the Russian Federation issued orders (closed to the press) which authorized the Russian Navy to sell excess ships and vessels for export only through the state Spetsvneshtekhnika company of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Trade. It was only natural, then, it would seem,

that when Georgiy Khizha, deputy chairman of the government, learned of the impending sale of the ships to Lithuania from the Baltic Fleet's report to the Russian State Committee on Property, he suspended implementation of the agreement until the matter could be reviewed by the Interdepartmental Commission on Technical Military Cooperation With Foreign Countries.

Every such transaction must have a legal basis, of course. According to reports acquired by the editors, no one in Moscow was particularly opposed to the Baltic Fleet's agreement with the Lithuanian government. It is still not clear, however, why this matter is to be reviewed by the interdepartmental commission. Our Russian government clearly has more than enough problems right now. It should obviously also be borne in mind, though, that the problem of obtaining housing for several thousand families of Russian sailors is also a priority.

In the meantime, several large trucks and trailers have arrived in Kaliningrad from Lithuania. They carried carpentry materials and plumbing items for the apartment buildings which Lithuania's Selma association is soon to build.

This freight was to have been delivered a month ago, to be sure.

What has held up the project? I addressed this question to Adm Vladimir Yegorov, commander of the Baltic Fleet.

"It has been held up by formalities," Vladimir Grigoryevich said, confirming my own thoughts, "which should have been resolved at the level of the Russian government. We believe that the lost time will be made up by a greater effort on the part of the Lithuanian construction workers, however. Despite all the difficulties, they remain committed to the agreement."

We know that Lithuania has promised to release the first apartment building for fleet families by May of next year. I therefore asked Selma President Vidas Laurinavicius whether the month's delay would affect the construction schedule.

"If there are no further problems," Mr. Laurinavicius said, "we shall catch up. Right now Lithuania has run out of energy. The plants which produce the construction materials for the fleet's future apartment buildings are also on the verge of coming to a halt. In the near future we will be going to the Russian government for help in resolving the energy problems of these plants."

Russian Deputy Defense Minister on Troop Withdrawals

LD1211051592 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1910 GMT 11 Nov 92

["Excerpts" of interview with Colonel General Boris Gromov, deputy defense minister, by unidentified correspondent; place, date not given—passages within quotation marks recorded; Gromov speaks in Russian with superimposed translation into English]

[Text] For the first time in world history, the withdrawal of an unprecedented number of the Russian troops back home within an extremely short period is being carried

out. The Deputy Russian Defense Minister Colonel General Boris Gromov is in charge of the operation. And here's what he had to tell Radio Moscow:

[Gromov] "The withdrawal and stationing of troops on Russian territory has been planned and is being carried out in accordance with the general conception of the Russian Armed Forces. Last year we removed all of our troops from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and on 25th September this year, the military withdrawal from Mongolia was finished. Russian troop units have already left Poland with only about 6,000 servicemen remaining to put things in order in former military garrisons.

"The withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany will be over by the end of 1994. About 57 percent of the personnel and 73 percent of hardware have already been removed. Talks are coming to an end on the withdrawal of a training brigade from the Republic of Cuba, approximately by the middle of next year."

Col. Gen. Boris Gromov was then asked: What about the withdrawal from former Soviet republics?

[Gromov] "As for the Russian military presence in former Soviet republics, the situation there is far more complicated, particularly in the Baltic states. Of more than 40,000 Russian servicemen currently stationed in the Baltics, to say nothing of their families, 24,000—almost half of them officers and warrant officers—are to be removed before the end of the year. The main difficulty consists in the scarcity of living space in the areas where the newly arrived servicemen will be settled.

"In this situation the Defense Ministry decided to suspend the withdrawal of those troop units in the Northwestern Group and the Baltic Fleet for which the necessary conditions on Russian territory have not been created. The Russian president signed a decree on the order and coordination of corresponding talks on the withdrawal from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia."

The next question put to the general was: What are the prospects of the Russian military withdrawal from other former Soviet republics?

[Gromov] "The problem of Russian troops in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Moldova is no less acute. We've settled in principle with Azerbaijan and Armenia. A temporary agreement with Georgia has also been signed. Nevertheless, the situation is complicated and the attitude towards Russian soldiers, especially in Georgia, is difficult to foretell. Russia's Defense Ministry is carrying out a set of measures to scale down the strength and partially disband the administrative structure of the military units stationed in those regions.

"As far as Central Asia's concerned, the troops of the former Turkestan Military District have come under the jurisdiction of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. National armed forces under the joint Russian-Turkmen command are being formed in Turkmenistan. At present there isn't any particular problem about the withdrawal of Russian troops from those countries and even from Tajikistan, but not before the situation there has stabilized."

Another question put to the general was: What can you say about the scale of the operation aimed at bringing Russian troops back home?

[Gromov] "Since 1989, about 500,000 Russian servicemen, more than 12,000 tanks, up to 13,000 artillery systems, and 3,000 planes and helicopters have been removed from various foreign countries. To continue the withdrawal in the next two years 298 billion rubles are needed according to the prices of September 1992."

And those were points of view made by Col. Gen. Boris Gromov, the deputy defense minister of the Russian Federation.

Russian Defense Aides on Reform Measures, Reduction in Force

*LD1811034492 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1233 GMT 17 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadynayskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 17 Nov—Major General Gennadiy Ivanov, chief of the directorate for military organization and reforms, stated at a briefing at the Russian Defense Ministry today that reform in the Russian Federation's Armed Forces was in full swing. The weapons at their disposal have been inventoried this year, the formation of mobile units in the Russian Armed Forces has begun, the Urals Military District has been restored, and the reform of other military districts, including the North Caucasus Military District, has also begun.

The military reform is based on the Army being reduced to a level of reasonable defense sufficiency and a move toward a mixed system of personnel acquisition and to making life within the Army more democratic, General Ivanov noted. The planned reduction in numbers in the Armed Forces is under way. Thus, troop staff numbers had been reduced by more than 180,000 by 15 November, and personnel in the Defense Ministry's central apparatus were reduced by more than 30 percent (over 6,000 individuals). At the same time, more than 140 generals' posts have been abolished, as have 41 directorates [upravleniye] and 140 departments [otdel] and sectors [napravleniye]. The number of staff personnel in the Armed Forces will be reduced by another 20,000 by the end of 1992. Moreover, the general said, 100,000 servicemen have been brought back into Russian territory this year, along with 2,000 tanks, 1,500 guns and mountings, and around 1 million tonnes of logistical and technical support equipment. Altogether there are plans to bring 250,000 servicemen back to Russia by the end of 1995, including 95,000 officers and ensigns, and more than 2 million tonnes of property and ammunition. Reliable management of the troops has now been restored.

Lieutenant General Gennadiy Bocharov, chief of a directorate in the main mobilization organization directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, noted that given the very acute shortage of conscripts, enlistments on contract will begin from 1 December this year. The Russian Government has made limited allocations for these purposes for 1993. The plan for 1993 is to recruit on contract 10 percent of the total number of service personnel required to staff the Armed Forces with troops and sergeants. The planned figure for 1995 is 35 percent; by the year 2000, it is planned

that recruitment through conscription and contracting will amount to 50 percent each. On the matter of benefits and remuneration, General Bocharov noted that those enlisted "on contract" can expect an extensive system of benefits. Their wages will vary, depending on where and in which Armed Forces branch they serve. The wage of those on contract with the ground troops is expected to be 13,000 rubles [R], with Air Force personnel receiving R15,000 and naval submarine fleet personnel R18,000. Military commissars and unit commanders will be involved in recruitment. General Bocharov noted that about R6 billion will be required next year alone for the enlistment of service personnel on contract.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Kazakh Ecology Ministry Details Secret Nuclear Tests

PM1011125192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Oct 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Oleg Stefashin: "Nuclear Explosions in Kazakhstan Were Carried Out in 27 Places"]

[Text] On the instructions of the government, the Kazakh Ministry of Ecology and Biological Resources has collected information, formerly thoroughly concealed, on so-called one-shot nuclear weapons tests carried out outside the Semipalatinsk test site.

It turns out that 38 nuclear explosions of differing yields were carried out at 27 different places over the years. Atyrau Oblast was used most actively for these purposes; in all 17 tests of mass destruction weapons were carried out there. Eight nuclear charges were exploded at test sites in the Urals area, and the rest in Aktyubinsk, Akhmedinsk, Mangistau, and South Kazakhstan Oblasts. In the opinion of staff of the Ministry of Ecology and Biological Resources, the data they have compiled throws light on the scale of the damage inflicted on the republic by nuclear weapons tests, and will also make it possible to take more effective measures for the ecological protection of Kazakhstan's population and environment.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Udmurt Concerns Over CW Destruction Plant Viewed

934P0006A Moscow NEDELIA in Russian No 39, Sep 92
[Signed to press 30 Sep 92] p 7

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Passions Surrounding Lewisite: How in the Udmurt City of Kambarka They Intend To Eliminate the Largest Stores of Poisonous Substances in Russia"]

[Text] Kambarka-Moscow—Kambarka Chief of Administration Vladimir Konyashin gave the Moscow interdepartmental commission a hostile reception. "Until you give us the 6 million you promised," he stated to General Yuriy Tarasevich, representative of the Russian Defense Ministry, "I will sign nothing."

Kambarka is not the largest city in Udmurtia. It has just 13,500 residents, 5,000 homes, and three plants. There is no sewage, plumbing, or gas line. But it is famous

throughout the world as the site of the largest stores of poisonous substances in the world.

Here in 90 cisterns, somewhat larger than tank cars and tightly walled into concrete, more than 6,000 tonnes of lewisite has been concentrated since the last war. A dark brown liquid with the sharp smell of geranium, just 20 milligrams of lewisite vapor dispersed in a few cubic meters of air is capable of inflicting death upon dozens, hundreds, even thousands of people.

Three years ago, when the Kambarkans suddenly learned of their unusual "wealth," of the fact that military and party authorities had hidden the truth from them for so many years concerning the horrible weapon, lurking literally under the windows of every house, passions reached an incredible fever pitch. And although no one ever recorded a single instance of lewisite poisoning, there was no slackening of demonstrations held at the gates of army arsenals and the building of the rayon soviet.

Demands that the deadly menace be immediately removed from the city, that people be compensated for psychological harm inflicted through risk of death over a half century from our own weapons of mass destruction, that normal living conditions be secured—installation of sewage treatment, plumbing, gas lines, construction of purification facilities at the pond from which Kambarka gets its drinking water—all of these battle cries led to a situation in which the old party-Soviet nomenklatura was swept away and new people came to power.

Vladimir Konyashin is one of those who led the struggle of Kambarkans against the arsenal. A former raykom [rayon committee] secretary and in those days principal of the local school, one who suffered at the hands of those same party bureaucrats, Konyashin promised city residents he would execute their orders and tied his destiny in with that of the lewisite stores.

"For four years now each of our families has known that it is living on top of a time bomb," the chairman of the Kambarka Rayispolkom [rayon executive committee] told me. "And the issue is still not resolved. The city has been told that the lewisite will not be transported away from here—neighboring oblasts and republics will not allow it to pass through their territory. While experts argue to this day as to what should be constructed here—a facility for destruction and conversion of the poisonous substances or a facility for removing them from their containers.

The important thing for Kambarkans is an absolute guarantee of safety during the operations. They insist that the directive body overseeing construction of a future facility consist of civilians who reside in the city and that capital investments in the structure not skirt around the social needs of the population.

"First we need money to satisfy the needs of the city, only then—for the facility," Konyashin states both at conferences of the Russian president's conventions committee on problems of chemical disarmament and at meetings with the military. "Otherwise we will see a second Chapayevsk."

The mentioning of Chapayevsk is neither threat nor blackmail. There both the Ministry of Defense and the government committed a strategic error: They first constructed a

plant for the destruction of projectiles and aerial bombs loaded with poisonous substances, investing over 100 million rubles in this project, and only then began to explain to the protesting population the necessity of such a facility. It did not work out.

In order for this not to be repeated in Kambarka, Konyashin is proposing that people be afforded an early opportunity to feel specific benefits from their proximity to a dangerous facility—to add supplements to their pensions and pay for the risk, to build hospitals, schools, a movie theater, construct roads, sewage treatment facilities, and gas lines, set up normal telephone communications, erect bridges across the rivers, build farmstead-type housing, improve the provision of foodstuffs and essential products to the people... According to estimates of local experts, the initial expenditures for such construction will come to over 2 billion.

A portion of this money for the city was promised by the military—about 6 million. The deputy chairman of the Udmurtia Council of Ministers has a letter to this effect, signed by Colonel General Stanislav Petrov. The chairman has already begun to build a main water pipeline using these funds. But the money never arrived in the city's accounts, and monthly penalties imposed already come to 200,000. Reason does exist for being cross at the military.

"We transferred the money to Kambarka," Major General Yuriy Tarasevich assured me. The deputy chief of the Directorate for Radiation, Chemical, and Bacteriological Protection added: "There is even more than we promised—16 million. Unfortunately, however, the country's banking system is letting us down."

But the problem is far more complex.

Essentially, the same thing the chief of the Kambarka administration is seeking has already been enplaced in the directive of the Russian Federation president "On Initial Measures for Preparation to Implement Russia's International Obligations in the Sphere of Destruction of Chemical Weapons Reserves." But here is where the misfortune lies—the billions required to implement this directive so badly needed by Konyashin, and by the chiefs of administration of other rayons in which deadly weapons of mass destruction are also stored, as well as by the military and the conventions committee, are not yet available. And no one can say how soon it will be before they appear.

The problem here does not involve the crisis in our economy. The government will only allocate money for a specific program, a concrete project coordinated with and approved by all interested parties. In addition to the city and rayon of Kambarka, their chief of administration and population, the interests of the Udmurtia State Committee for Ecology and Utilization of the Environment and of the autonomy's Council of Ministers and other officials must be taken into account.

Vladimir Lonshakov, a representative of the Udmurtia Council of Ministers, stated:

"We will convert the lewisite in the republic into arsenic. And we want this to be a joint-stock enterprise, a portion of whose income will go into the budget."

Also having their own interests here are the many thousands of collectives of contracting, design, and scientific research organizations, which would develop, test, and convert to metal and concrete the projected designs, and obtain the final product.

Then there is also the Russian Ministry of Defense, responsible for safety in storing the lewisite, and the conventions committee, obligated to begin its destruction and conversion in the shortest possible time frame...

But the interests of the various departments do not coincide.

The military, for example, insists on the construction in Kambarka of a facility for removing the poisonous substances from their obsolete fixed storage tanks and placing them in modern, transportable, technologically efficient containers which would undergo all required testing and demonstrate absolute safety with respect to storing the lewisite. Such a container would enable the substances to be transported to any region where a facility would be constructed for conversion of the chemical weapons.

But the conventions committee of the Russian president is convinced that the facility must accomplish the process of rapid neutralization of the poisonous substances, and then effect a displacement of neutralized material into containers, so that it may be converted into the industrial arsenic which is such a valuable raw material to the electronics industry—the cost of one kilogram fluctuates on the world market around \$2,000.

The committee has several designs of such a facility which could be selected, designs which have been solidly approved by international experts. True, there is not as yet any design-experimentation model; on-location testing has not been conducted. This too requires time and resources.

"But as far as our position of principle is concerned," Academician Anatoliy Kuntsevich, chairman of the conventions committee, told me in conversation, "we are prepared for any compromise, and in working out any final decision we will proceed first and foremost from the interests of the local population, of providing totally for their safety and ensuring their comprehensive social needs. Only then will we select a specific project through which destruction of the chemical weapons can begin."

Our editors have learned that this selection has already been made.

It was decided at a session of the conventions committee in which all concerned parties participated to construct in Kambarka a facility for removing the material from the old tanks and neutralizing the poisonous substances. Taking their experience into account, it was decided to designate the construction organizations of the Russian Ministry of Defense as general contractor.

This decision should become a resolution of the Russian Government in the next few days.

Prior to sending this material to press for publication, I phoned Vladimir Konyashin, chairman of the rayispolkom in Kambarka.

"We still have not received the money, and we are waiting for it. But all the conflict with the military has been

removed. We have published the decision of the conventions committee in the local press and people have reacted calmly to it. I am traveling to America to find out how this kind of thing is handled there."

Well, for the time being passions over lewisite have subsided. But for how long—only time will tell.

Further on Mirzayanov CW Secrecy Case

Military Blamed for Arrest

93WC0007A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 1-8 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Viktor Loshak: "Kalugin Syndrome"]

[Text] We saw the likes of it two years ago. KGB General Oleg Kalugin was stripped of his state awards and general's rank. A criminal prosecution was initiated against him, following his first interview for MN. At that time, the general only slightly lifted a corner of the heavy curtain of secrecy covering the unlawful aspects of the KGB activity, and he called for public control over the monster. Now again we have state security investigators confiscating our materials and writing protocols. But the two chemists tried to accomplish what boils down to a repetition of Kalugin's act: to warn the public of a potential threat to the security and prestige of this country. The double standards used in the sphere of chemical weapons [CW] can become a stumbling block for Russian policy. Besides, development and storage of poisons in the densely-populated area of Moscow is fraught with an ecological peril.

Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov got an inappropriate response to their article: search and arrest. An article on the same problem, intended for publication in the AiF [ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] newspaper, was confiscated, and a journalist from NEW TIMES who had interviewed the scientists was interrogated. The state security officers who made their appearance in the MN office on the day of the arrest couldn't explain: what kind of secret was divulged by Mirzayanov and Fedorov?

Among the ensuing numerous telephone calls to the MN headquarters was the following: "We (at an important Japanese newspaper—V.L.) re-read the article, but failed to find anything we didn't know before."

An arrest in response to a newspaper article is more than infringement upon the freedom of speech. In fact, it is corroboration of a rule that never changes: politics, rights, and ideology must cater to the interests of the military top brass, and the commitment to civil values is to be curtailed to suit the interests of marshals and generals. In the MN article it was told how one of them, earlier lavished with awards and decorations for his involvement in the development of chemical weapons, now allegedly leads the disarmament efforts. It took more than a month to track down the revealing of a state secret in an article published in a back issue. According to information at our disposal, the experts who discerned the leak of a secret are subordinates of that "hawkish" chemical designer from the institute mentioned in our article.

I'm afraid that the infamous visit of the Pamyat ultrarightists to the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLET office will look like a prank by frolicking clowns in comparison to

visits and arrests by state security officers. It is important to know the initiators: is it the military-industrial complex, the KGB's successors, or the Russian Prosecutor General (who constantly displays his displeasure with the press)? Another little step in this direction could restore ("in response to numerous requests from the working people") the practice of preliminary censorship of the press, which always served as a means for preserving of the old order. Then the generals would find it very easy to make a fool of the president: let him issue peace appeals, and we will go on spawning weapons of immense capacity. Their logic is simple: first, to hamper the building of a normal life in the country, and then to bring back military confrontation. It turns out that Prof. Mirzayanov has been put in Lefortovo Prison precisely for opposing that plan.

Legal Basis of Charges Queried

93WC0007B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 1-8 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Natalya Gevorkyan: "It is a Dubious Privilege for an MN Author To Be Indicted by a Law Which No Longer Exists"]

[Text] "Please specify the law which Mirzayanov allegedly broke."

"The law... I need a peek into the Criminal Code. Well, it is a law against divulging state secrets."

"That is Article 75?"

"That is Article 75."

It was an interesting talk with the Security Ministry investigator at Lefortovo. Days later, our author officially faced prosecution on the basis of Article 75. Had I asked the investigator to define a "state secret," he would have failed, because there's no official definition of it. The draft of the law on state secrets is still being discussed by parliamentary committees. The case of Mirzayanov can be used by those who favour the harshest possible wording of that law.

Yeltsin's decree from January 14, 1992, has filled the vacant legal space. For lack of a better version, the decree proposes a return to the old formula: the protection of state secrets of the Russian Federation will be covered by "the existing legislation concerning that sphere until new laws appear." The Security Ministry is to coordinate the protection of state secrets.

Now the investigator is sitting and thinking: how to incriminate Mirzayanov who ventured to reveal to the public a skeleton in the cupboard of the military-industrial complex, on the basis of "existing legislation" (which proliferated during the Soviet era).

MN has warned about the possible impact of the presidential decree in the current legislative void and the absence of an updated official list of secrets. In practice, the old legal norms specify things like the catch of fish and methods of athletic training as secrets on par with information about the KGB's structure. It isn't accidental that an MN author was the first and the only victim of that unnatural situation.

Imprisoned was a scientist who openly came out, in a local newspaper, against the double-dealing in the sphere of chemical weapons, and thus warned the Russian public and the President, as well as those from whom we borrow money and accept humanitarian aid but from whom we still keep secrets. He is not like the KGB officers who sell professional secrets, the Prosecutor General who tramples on the confidentiality of an investigation before the court trial by publishing memoirs, or the military, who are prepared to publish memoirs spiced with the secrets of the General Staff (who would accept their memoirs otherwise?) in the West.

The case of Mirzayanov is a warning aimed at all honest people in the military-industrial complex, the sciences, the army, and the organs of repression: think before you confide in journalists. This is a country where the explosion of yet another nuclear reactor can be forestalled only by an information leak, and where that leak is punished by state security agencies. And, thanks to the Constitutional Court, we know now that the state security agencies never act without authorization from the top.

Bio Information on Mirzayanov, Fedorov

93WC0007D Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 1-8 Nov 92 p 4

[Article: "MN File"]

[Text] Vil Mirzayanov, b. 1935, D. Sc. (Chemistry), expert in physical chemistry and an authority in the field of chromatographic analysis of substances in minute concentrations. In 1958 Mirzayanov graduated from Moscow Institute of Fine Chemical Technologies and became Candidate of Sciences in 1965. From 1965-January 1992 he worked in GSNIIOKhT [State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology] and from a junior research assistant became the department chief.

He quit the job at the institute in January 1992 because he was against further development and production of chemical weapons.

He has a wife and three children.

Lev Fedorov, 56, D. Sc. (Chemistry), physical chemistry expert, graduate of the cadet school and a military officers school (1953-56) in Kostroma (majoring in chemical warfare), Soviet army officer until 1959. His later career has been connected with science: Chemistry Department of Moscow University, and Institute of Elementary Organic Compounds. Following six years of work at the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences Fedorov joined the Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry where he has been working since. In 1983 he became Doctor of Sciences. He wrote three books on chemistry.

He has a wife and two daughters.

Mirzayanov on Imprisonment, Charges

934P0018A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
3 Nov 92 p 14

[Report by KOMMERSANT correspondent Olga Shlyapnikova: "Vil Mirzayanov: It Was Only Speculation"]

[Text] As promised on 31 October, KOMMERSANT is reporting the news on the case of Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov—the authors of the article "Poisonous Policy" in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI newspaper. Saturday was a sad day for Mirzayanov: He was officially charged under Article 75 of the Russian Criminal Code (divulging state secrets). On 2 November, however, by the ruling of the Kalininskiy Rayon court, which changed the measure to secure the appearance of the accused, the chemist was released from the Lefortovo investigative detention facility. At home, Mirzayanov was met by his wife Nuriya, son Iskander, and KOMMERSANT correspondent Olga Shlyapnikova, whose material we offer for your attention.

Upon his arrival home, Vil Mirzayanov embraced his family, had a meal, and then began the tale of his days in the detention facility.

"The Lefortovo prison," says Mirzayanov, "is an enormous moral press. Everything here is aimed at breaking the person, subjugating him to the investigators' will. Visits and correspondence are forbidden. Of the press, only ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and sometimes IZVESTIYA and TRUD are permitted for reading. The light in the cell is on at all times; glasses are taken away for the night period. In my opinion, Lefortovo is all ready to receive democrats—everything has been repaired and freshly painted."

"After my arrest," continued Mirzayanov, stirring his tea with a spoon, "I was in the cell alone for two days. I only learned about prisoners' rights on the second day—the jailers were in no hurry to inform me of them. I declared a hunger strike, since from the very beginning I considered myself innocent. I wrote a complaint to the court of Kalininskiy Rayon of the City of Moscow (where the prison is located), protesting the unlawful arrest."

Mirzayanov said that right before the court hearing, he was summoned by investigator Viktor Shkarin, who said without preamble that Mirzayanov's attorney, Alsnis, was only looking for political capital in his case and therefore Mirzayanov's wife wanted to bring a new defense attorney into the case—Vladimir Vasilyev. As it turned out later, Mirzayanov's wife had not dismissed Alsnis. Mirzayanov figured out, however, that Vasilyev was a Ministry of Security proxy and refused his services.

On 2 November a hearing on Mirzayanov's case took place in the court of Moscow's Kalininskiy Rayon. The court took into consideration the fact that "Mirzayanov does not present a danger to the public and cannot interfere with the investigation in some way or other," as well as the fact that he has two children. The court's ruling: to release the scientist from detention, having secured his pledge not to leave town.

Vil related how the charges against him had come about. After the publication of the material in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, a technical commission was set up, which consisted of staff members of the Ministry of Security and of the Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNIIOKhT]. On 2 October the commission, having established the fact of divulgence of state secrets, sent the results of the examination to General Tselikovskiy, chief of the ministry's Main Administration for Combating Economic Crimes. The commission's arguments were as follows: First, the chemist revealed information on the creation of a new weapon; second, he

divulged the fact that Russia was working on creating binary weapons; and, third, he named the sites where this weapon was being tested and produced. On the basis of this assessment, Mirzayanov was charged under Article 75 of the Criminal Code.

Mirzayanov told the KOMMERSANT correspondent that he had never been cleared for the secret work on the development of new weapons and had nothing to do with the development of binary weapons. As to the article, he had only advanced speculation that such a weapon had been created. In the near future, the investigation will appoint independent technical experts in order to establish whether state secrets have in fact been divulged.

On 5 November the Ministry of Security will hold a briefing on the chemists' case, on which KOMMERSANT will report on 6 November.

Russia Said To Violate CW Commitments

93WC0007C Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 44, 1-8 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Aleksey Pushkov: "Russia Hasn't Violated Anything?"]

[Text] Russia, as is known, hasn't repealed the Soviet Union's commitment to stop production of chemical weapons. Moreover, Russia played an active role in the preparation of a convention banning development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and promoting the destruction of chemical weapons. The draft was accepted in Geneva in September and is expected to be signed as a treaty this January.

But how can the information about creation of new types of chemical weapons tally with Russia's official policy and commitments?

Certain unidentified experts of the Russian Foreign Ministry disarmament department told us the following: "Development of chemical weapons is not infringing on any international legal norms until the convention is signed. We pledged not to produce chemical weapons but never to abstain from development and research in that sphere."

If we are not dealing here with industrial production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, it is impossible to blame us, from the point of view of international law provisions. Nevertheless, the questions remain, and not only moral questions.

First: did the country's supreme rulers know about that? In other words, are we dealing with underhand political actions contradicting the spirit of our own official declarations, or with an unauthorized activity of the military departments?

Second: if this activity is underway, who can guarantee that it will stop after we sign the chemical weapons convention?

This issue concerns not only our partners in chemical disarmament but also us, the Russian public. It is a well-known fact that the USSR continued to work on its bacteriological weapon into April of 1992, though it had signed the bacteriological weapons convention back in 1972. I'm speaking about the attack means, rather than the

means of protection against the attack, contrary to the assertions of Soviet diplomats. Apparently, the anthrax outburst in Sverdlovsk killing several hundred people was a direct result of that work.

We are aware that not only individual citizens but also the state, or its individual institutions, can commit crimes. Uncovering the crimes is in the interests of all citizens, even if it involves infringement of the existing law.

Officials Offer Justification for Mirzayanov Prosecution

Political Persecution, Treaty Violations Denied

OW111123092 Moscow Central Television First Program
and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 5 Nov 92

[Interview with A.D. Gorbovskiy, director of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration under the Russian Presidency's Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons; and A.P. Kondaurav, deputy chief of the Ministry of Security's Public Relations Center, by Mikhail Solntsev; from the "Utro" program—live]

[Text] [Solntsev] The scandal that erupted recently when state secrets involving chemical weapons were divulged caused a certain stir both in Russia and abroad. We have with us people who are directly involved in putting an end to this scandal, am I not correct?

[Kondaurav] It is hard to say...

[Solntsev, interrupting] In any case, I am happy to introduce our guests. This is Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Gorbovskiy, a doctor of engineering sciences and director of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration under the Russian Presidency's Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons—a very long title. Good morning.

[Gorbovskiy] Good morning.

[Solntsev] And this is Aleksey Petrovich Kondaurav, deputy chief of the Russian Ministry of Security's Public Relations Center. Good morning.

[Kondaurav] Good morning.

[Solntsev] Let us begin with the article published by Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, in which they accuse Russia of breaking international agreements banning chemical weapons. Mirzayanov was arrested, Fedorov was not.

[Kondaurav] Mirzayanov was detained. The nature of the action taken against him was changed, and he was released from custody on his own recognizance. But criminal charges against him have not been dropped.

[Solntsev] How do you feel about the recent criticism that has been leveled at your department—criticism that says you have again started persecuting dissidents and those who disagree with current policy?

[Kondaurav] As to dissidents, in terms of this accusation against us, I would say that we do not persecute those who disagree with policy, but, rather, we pursue those who break the law. When criticism is not constructive and shows no desire for absolute truth, we treat it in a very

relaxed way. The Ministry of Security, in accordance with the Law on Federal Security Organs, is charged with and is responsible for protecting state secrets. Our workers do not have the right—I repeat, do not have the right—to look the other way and not act when a law is being broken. The Mirzayanov case, in both our opinion and that of the Procurator's Office, which sanctioned criminal proceedings, and the detaining of Mirzayanov... [changes thought] We think that an offense has taken place, and criminal charges have been brought against the suspect, as defined by Article 75 of the Russian Federation decree. Nevertheless, I must repeat that the filing of criminal charges does not amount to saying unanimously that a person is guilty or not. A thorough inquiry is called for, and this is why we have the police and the court.

[Solntsev] Aleksandr Dmitriyevich, what are your comments on these accusations against the Russian Government—accusations that claim the government is breaking its international commitments in the sphere of chemical weapons? What is your opinion as a chief of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration?

[Gorbovskiy] Indeed, after reading these articles, many people may form such an opinion, but let me note that a whole series of international agreements are in place today. The first is the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, and other gases in wartime. This protocol does not, however, ban the development, manufacture, and production of chemical weapons. As to the second document, a memorandum on the exchange of information and control in observing the ban on chemical weapons was signed in 1989. The first stage of this information exchange has been carried out, as was a mutual visit of U.S. and Russian inspectors. The subsequent release of data on military chemical potential is planned for 1993, as are inspections aimed at working out international control procedures. There are mutual agreements on destroying chemical weapons which have yet to be put into effect because Russia's industrial base is not prepared for large-scale destruction of chemical weapons. Finally, there is a convention currently under development—it is practically ready—which, if signed, will completely ban the development, manufacture, and all other activities related to chemical weapons.

[Solntsev] As a chief of an administration overseeing chemical weapons, how do you feel about these publications by Mirzayanov and Fedorov on the problem of banning chemical weapons?

[Gorbovskiy] The signing of the convention banning chemical weapons is far from being just the wish of politicians. Nevertheless, a material base, the allocation of funds, solutions to an entire complex of economic and technological problems, the construction of unique destruction sites, and the furnishing of laboratories with modern, world-level equipment is essential. The activity of scientists, and these groundless statements... [changes thought] They were not included in resolving these important problems.

A whole team of scientists is working on this, and there are planned steps designed to hasten the solution of these problems. And yet, such statements do not really contribute anything to this process. On the contrary, they

generate distrust in our negotiating partners, as well as prolong this period we would like to put behind us as soon as possible.

[Solntsev] So, this is directly damaging to the talks. I have a question for Aleksey Petrovich. Why were criminal charges brought only against Mirzayanov while Fedorov was left alone?

[Kondaurov] For the same reason that the Ministry of Security works strictly within the limits of the law. Despite the fact that some mass media bodies presented the case as a persecution of journalists, Mirzayanov is not a journalist but a party to state secrets. As to Fedorov, he has no connection to any secrets; he is just the coauthor of the article. Therefore, no criminal charges were brought against Fedorov. We act in accordance with the law and strictly within the limits of the law.

[Solntsev] Does the phrase party to a secret mean that the person signed a document pledging not to divulge it?

[Kondaurov] Yes, he signed such a document, and he had access to state secrets in his work. There are voices claiming that because there is no law on state secrets, there can be no case against Mirzayanov. Nevertheless, there is a list of the most important secret data, which was confirmed by the USSR Council of Ministers; this list was made legal by a decree from the Russian president in January, and it remains in effect today. Also, there is Article 75 of the Russian Federation decree on the divulging of state secrets.

[Solntsev] Can you tell me what is new on the Russian Ministry of Security's front lines?

[Kondaurov] The Russian Ministry of Security is working fairly intensively and under a rigid schedule, and the Mirzayanov case is not the only one. We have acted on many cases recently. One of the most serious was when we, in cooperation with the St. Petersburg organs, arrested a group of combatants engaged in banditry and robbery. About 500 people were involved in this criminal group's activities. Several dozen are already under arrest, and firearms, ammunitions, edged weapons, and material possessions worth more than a half-billion rubles were confiscated from them during the investigation.

[Solntsev] A half-billion?

[Kondaurov] Yes. Recently, the Russian Federation's Ministry of Security arrested a member of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who was suspected of accepting a bribe for issuing overseas travel passports—on 23 October.

[Solntsev] Is the amount of the bribe known?

[Kondaurov] Let us say that this is still a secret of the investigation.

The chairman of a cooperative was arrested on suspicion of grand theft through the use of false documents. On 26 October, acting on information received during an investigation, and with the procurator's sanction, a search was conducted in a building occupied by one of Moscow's commercial banks, and a great deal of unregistered material wealth was confiscated. The list for even the past few days is fairly long, and it all involves breaches of trust and

the acceptance of bribes—in short, activities of corrupt officials, including those within law enforcement organs.

[Solntsev] I would like to thank you for coming here so early. We have discussed a subject which is of interest to everyone.

Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Gorbovskiy, director of the Chemical Weapons Issues Administration under the Russian Presidency's Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons; and Aleksey Petrovich Kondaurov, deputy chief of the Russian Ministry of Security's Public Relations Center, thank you both, and good luck at work.

Legal Errors, Ongoing CW Development Admitted
93P50021A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
6 Nov 92 p 15

[Olga Shlyapnikova report: "Briefing on the Mirzayanov Affair": "The Ministry Improperly Imprisoned the Scientist"]

[Text] Yesterday there was a briefing in the Russian Ministry of Security [MBRF] about the Vil Mirzayanov affair—the author of the article "Poisonous Policy" (see MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI for 20 September). We have already reported on this in KOMMERSANT for 3 October.

In the words of Yuriy Demin, chief of the ministry's legal support service [sluzhba pravovogo obespecheniya], the investigation still has to examine the question of the legality of bringing charges against Mirzayanov under Article 75 of the Russian Criminal Code (disclosing state secrets). In answer to a question from the KOMMERSANT correspondent on the reason for the change in the conditions under which Mirzayanov is being detained, Yuriy Demin answered, "the Ministry of Security obviously erred in keeping the scientist in jail."

In 1987 the USSR declared that it had stopped the development of chemical weapons [CW]. However, under the Geneva Convention (1989), the production of toxic substances is permitted in minimal quantities (up to 1,000 tonnes per year) for the needs of the medical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as for defensive purposes.

As Aleksandr Gorbovskiy, a member of the president's committee on CW affairs, reported, the article touches on important state secrets, and Mirzayanov "cannot evaluate the degree to which he has harmed the Motherland."

On the question of the ecological safety of the test sites where toxic substances are tested, Gorbovskiy reported that "there is no threat to the health of the inhabitants of the surrounding regions," and added that Mirzayanov himself can confirm this information. The member of the presidential committee also said that Russia is in fact developing new binary weapons but, in justification, pointed out that "the United States began to develop them much earlier."

In the course of the briefing, Mirzayanov sent a complaint to Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepanov on the illegality of the investigation's actions and requested that the matter be transferred to the Russian General Procuracy. Mirzayanov may receive an answer from the procuracy as early as next week. Read KOMMERSANT for 14 November.

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Shaposhnikov on Problem of Ownership of Strategic Forces

LD0411113992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1038 GMT
4 Nov 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Excerpt] Moscow November 4 TASS—The main factor which hampers the settlement of disputes concerning the Commonwealth strategic forces is that they belong to no particular state, while judging by all documents, they belong to Russia, according to Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the Commonwealth Joint Armed Forces.

Shaposhnikov spoke to journalists before the meeting of the CIS defence ministers. He noted that the question about the strategic forces is the central item of the agenda of today's meeting of the Defence Ministers Council. Unfortunately, none of the Commonwealth member-countries which possess nuclear weapons has ratified the relevant agreement, Shaposhnikov lamented.

As soon as the agreement is ratified, all problems will be solved quiet promptly, the marshal said. According to him, the standpoints of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan are quiet close to each other in this respect. As for Ukraine, its stance has "certain peculiarities".

As regards the composition of the strategic forces, this item on the agenda is not likely to come up against any obstructions during the discussion, Shaposhnikov said. [passage omitted]

Ukrainian Parliament's Stance on Nuclear Arms Viewed

MK1211091792 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian Nos. 45-46 (Signed to press 10 Nov 92) p 11

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Lartsev, candidate of philosophical sciences, and Vladimir Ruban, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Ukraine correspondent: "Ukrainian Parliament Dreams of Atom Bomb"]

[Text] The National Security Council, headed by President Kravchuk, approved Ukraine's draft military doctrine back in May this year. At last, after repeated debate in parliamentary commissions, the people's deputies examined the draft in plenary session at the end of October. And they sent it back for further work.

Many deputies believe that Ukraine will not benefit from being a nonnuclear, nonaligned [vneblokovy] state. But these were the principles that were enshrined in the Declaration of Ukrainian State Sovereignty (July 1990) and later reaffirmed in a special Supreme Soviet statement in October last year. Moreover, according to the defense minister, Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, declaring Ukraine to be a nuclear state would be out of step with its economic potential and strategic interests. As regards Ukraine's non-aligned status, the draft military doctrine proposes a compromise—in the event of aggression being prepared against Ukraine, it could act with other states to thwart any attack. But by no means everyone was satisfied with this.

Just why have the people's deputies changed their position so markedly in just a year?

Parliamentary Revenge

As the economic crisis deepens, authoritarian trends are objectively getting stronger. The authorities are trying to hang on, primarily by strengthening the Army, the state security service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, a relatively influential military lobby has emerged of late. It is made up, on the one hand, of people's deputies who are military men (Major General Vladimir Tolubko and Lieutenant General Boris Sharikov, who, prior to 24 August 1991, opposed Ukraine's secession from the USSR and the development of national armed forces, before abruptly adopting this position), and, on the other hand, by their colleagues from the patriotic officers' union.

The failure of the draft military doctrine in the Supreme Soviet was also brought about by the fact that it was debated the day after the new government was confirmed. Premier Leonid Kuchma set deputies a tough condition—either they voted for the entire Cabinet of Ministers, or he would not be responsible for its future activities. The parliamentarians gave way, but they were to have their revenge. The examination of the draft military doctrine came (from the standpoint of the people's representatives) right on cue. At the same time, the deputies taught the president a lesson too. The majority in parliament showed Leonid Kravchuk—who is leaning toward the idea of calling early elections to the Supreme Soviet—that it is too early to write off the old parliament. Nor did the democratic opposition, which the president has played a part in fragmenting—miss the chance to make its presence felt.

Other deputies (former communists) withheld support from the draft military doctrine in order to protest the influence wielded over the Defense Ministry leadership by Vladimir Mulyava, head of the ministry's social psychology [sotsialno-psikhologicheskii] service and placeman of the national radicals, who in less than a year has been promoted from reserve-list sergeant to major general. He has not yet managed to set up an effective social psychology service designed to replace political organs, but attempts are being made to inculcate officers and warrant officers—most of whom are Russians—in the traditions of the Ukrainian insurgent army and Ukrainian nationalism. Many people do not like this.

Ukrainian Defense

The foreign policy reasons are no less important. The deputies are following with alarm the exacerbation of the political struggle in Russia and the statements made by the National Salvation Front leaders, and they believe that if the latter were to come to power, a nonnuclear and nonaligned Ukraine could find itself defenseless.

Nor is everything smooth in relations with the current Russian Federation leadership. The Yalta accords—specifically on the Black Sea Fleet—are not being implemented (and Ukrainian politicians blame the Russian side). Kiev also well remembers that recently Russia has essentially twice made territorial claims against Ukraine (last year immediately after the declaration of Ukrainian state independence, and this year at the height of the Crimea

confrontation). Similar schemes are being hatched by various political forces in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland... "In order to guarantee its territorial integrity, Ukraine needs to control at least a small nuclear potential which would act as a deterrent," the well-known radical Stepan Khmara stated from the Supreme Soviet rostrum. And he was not alone in that opinion.

Possible Maneuvers

So just how will events pan out? The Army, the military-industrial complex, and the state as a whole cannot function normally for long without a military doctrine. Without one it will be impossible even to downsize the armed forces. The president, the head of the government, and the defense minister will either have to wait for new elections to the Supreme Soviet (which will not be for at least a year) or try to persuade the present parliamentarians to accept a compromise. Clearly, it would be effective for the Defense Ministry leadership to issue a statement which would present the Supreme Soviet with a choice of either approving the draft military doctrine or rejecting the declaration of Ukraine as a nonnuclear, nonaligned state. The people's deputies would hardly be likely to assume that responsibility. But it is unlikely that Konstantyn Morozov will go for broke. This means that Ukraine will clearly have to survive for a time without a military doctrine.

Parliament Speaker: No Nuclear Weapons in Azerbaijan

NC1011164392 Baku TURAN in English 1227 GMT
10 Nov 92

[Text] Baku 10 Nov (TURAN)—Chairman of the parliament Isa Kamberov distributed the official statement, running that Azerbaijan had none of nuclear weapons on his territory.

It was Interior Minister Iskender Khamidov who engineered another political brawl with his next baloney. The minister publicly declared that he had several nuclear bombs and would drop them on Armenia, should the latter fail to stop its aggression against Azerbaijan.

The chairman of the parliament announced at the Milli Mejlis today that such irresponsible declarations were giving rise to the world community's distrust and might have grave complications for the republic.

Members of the Milli Mejlis also condemn the interior minister's actions.

Shaposhnikov Wants Russia-Ukraine Nuclear Summit

OW1211131392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1110 GMT 12 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Marshal Shaposhnikov has spoken for a Russian-Ukrainian summit to discuss nuclear weapons in Ukrainian territory. He said Russia is the only country that should have such weapons, therefore Moscow and Kiev must reach a compromise.

The longer Ukraine has nuclear weapons without appropriate control, the marshal said, the greater the threat of

various incidents related to their safety. The current situation is very dangerous, primarily for Ukraine, and it should realize that. According to the marshal, Ukraine does not have the experts who could properly control nuclear weapons. In this matter Moscow and Kiev should not act like they did in the case of the Black Sea fleet.

The marshal is attending a meeting of the foreign ministers of CIS countries in Moscow who are discussing the CIS charter as well as mutual recognition of visas, the formation of an international TV company, the training of officers etc. Mr. Shaposhnikov believes that the adoption of the charter is a cornerstone of the future of the CIS.

The marshal said that there are no nuclear weapons in the conflict zones in Russia. When the Chechen president Dudayev says something to this end, he exaggerates, the commander stressed.

Kravchuk Reiterates Nuclear Arms Position in Talk With Clinton

*LD1211064892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0615 GMT 12 Nov 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York November 12 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk reiterated that his country is ready to eliminate or withdraw from its territory all nuclear arms if it receives preliminary compensation from Russia.

In a telephone conversation with U.S. President-elect Bill Clinton on Wednesday Kravchuk said that "Ukraine wants to play a stabilising role in the region", according to Clinton's spokesman George Stephanopoulos.

Clinton supported Ukrainian intention to become a nuclear-free state, according to the spokesman.

Ukrainian Aide: No Knowledge of Independent Nuclear Arms Codes

*LD1411142492 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 2300 GMT 13 Nov 92*

[Text] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Tarasyuk has said that he does not know anything about any kind of attempts to draw up Ukraine's own nuclear weapons codes. Tarasyuk, who heads the Ukrainian Committee for Disarmament, said this in an interview with Radio Liberty, commenting on an article in THE NEW YORK TIMES. The article asserted that one of the institutes in Kharkov is working out new nuclear weapons codes.

Kazakhstan Official Affirms Adherence to Nuclear Treaties

*LD1711020692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1348 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[By KAZTAG correspondent Ivan Zakharchenko for TASS]

[Text] Alma-Ata, 16 Nov—"The assertion that Kazakh territory holds enough nuclear weapons to ensure that the globe could be destroyed twice over will only evoke a bewildered smile from a competent person. I state categorically that our republic loyally observes all treaties on nuclear weapons and advocates the total destruction of

such weapons," stated Kim Serikbayev, head of the defense department in the president's apparatus and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Such an assertion was made by Yusuf Wali, Egyptian deputy prime minister and secretary general of the National Democratic Party, the ruling party in Egypt, in a speech in Aswan on 12 November. In his words, some neighboring states are presently negotiating with Alma-Ata at the highest level with the aim of obtaining the lethal weapons; they can subsequently be used against the Arab countries and against Egypt in particular.

It is absurd to even suggest that we intend to sell them to anybody, Serikbayev stressed in an interview to KAZTAG. "Let Yusuf Wali have this statement on his conscience," Serikbayev said.

"This is by no means the first fabrication," he pointed out. "Many people are not happy to see stability in our state and the authority it enjoys on the international scene, which was achieved, to a large extent, thanks to the president and government. Some not quite honest people are prepared to resort to any provocations to inflict damage on the newly emerged sovereign Kazakhstan."

NATO Commander Visits Ukraine, Discusses Nuclear Disarmament

Kravchuk Seeks Security Guarantee

*LD1611200892 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya
Television Network in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 16 Nov 92*

[Text] General John Shalikashvili, supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe—he is also the commander of U.S. forces in Europe—is in Kiev on an official visit. A report from our correspondent, Volodymyr Hutsov:

[Hutsov] Today General John Shalikashvili met with Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine. There was an exchange of views with regard to the problems of Ukraine's nuclear-free and nonaligned status. We are firmly abiding by this policy, President Kravchuk said. However, those countries that are interested in nuclear disarmament of Ukraine should guarantee its security. A statement on the non-use of weapons of mass destruction against those states which have voluntarily given them up would be beneficial.

In the opinion of Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine should be included in all European structures which would completely guarantee its security and make aggression on the part of neighbors impossible. Practical steps of cooperation between the military of NATO and Ukraine were also discussed, in particular the training of our officers in educational establishments of the North Atlantic Alliance.

These and other problems of military formation and the preservation of stability in Europe were discussed during the meeting of John Shalikashvili with Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov and Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko.

Nuclear Weapons Not for Sale

*LD1711213592 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1913 GMT
17 Nov 92*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent for TASS]

[Text] Kiev November 17 TASS—After the Soviet Union disintegration and the elimination of the Warsaw Treaty, political tasks gain the priority in NATO policy, Supreme Allied Commander Europe John Shalikashvili told Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Ivan Plyushch and Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma.

NATO is interested in the preservation of peace, upkeep of stability and security in Europe, settlement of armed conflicts on the continent and rendering of humanitarian assistance to CIS states, he noted.

A NATO delegation headed by General Shalikashvili is currently in Kiev on an official visit. Visit results were summed up today at a joint news conference of Ukrainian Defence Minister Konstantyn Morozov and General Shalikashvili.

The major aim of the visit is to discuss military-political cooperation with new Ukraine and help formation of its armed forces, said the general, adding they were glad to hear Ukraine remains adherent to the principles of a non-nuclear and off-bloc state.

It was stressed during the meetings and the news conference, Ukraine does not intend to sell nuclear warheads to anyone. The issue of their elimination is being solved together with Russia. They also raised technical and financial problems of elimination of strategic nuclear arms stationed on Ukrainian territory, provision of its safety and social aspects connected with the reduction of the Ukrainian Army and its building.

It was noted the Ukrainian parliament soon plans to ratify a package of documents on reduction of strategic nuclear arms and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Minister Qualifies Disarmament Stance

OW1811121892 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1140 GMT 18 Nov 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine has no plans to sell nuclear warheads to anyone and will tackle all problems of their elimination jointly with Russia. This statement was made during the meeting in Kiev between Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, Ivan Plyushch, and Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma with Commander-in-Chief of NATO's joint forces in Europe, John Shalikashvili.

Following the talks, John Shalikashvili said during a press conference that he welcomed Ukraine's adherence to the principles of the nuclear-free power which does not belong to any military alliances. It is early yet to talk about Ukraine's membership in NATO, he said, because it might provoke undesirable tensions in Europe.

In this connection, Ukrainian Defence Minister Konstantyn Morozov, who also took part in the press conference, noted that Ukraine "reserved for itself the right to establish alliances with other states if its territorial integrity comes under threat and to engage in nuclear disarmament with due account taken of its economic, political and military interests".

It was announced during the press conference that the Ukrainian parliament will shortly ratify the package of

documents on the reduction of the strategic weapons and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Shaposhnikov Views CIS Security 'Blueprint,' Nuclear Issues

PM1611203192 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report on "exclusive" interview with Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, by Viktor Litovkin; place, date not given: "Military Danger to the Commonwealth Now Lies Within It, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov Believes"]

[Text] The CIS military security blueprint adopted by the Commonwealth heads of state has not yet been published. What is the gist of the blueprint, in what direction are the independent states' military doctrines developing, and who is their potential enemy? Our military observer put these and other questions to Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, in an exclusive interview.

No Point Looking for Enemies

I am dead against such terms as "potential opponent" or "enemy," Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said. Seventy years and more of general suspicion and constant searching for enemies inside and outside the country have already brought us to the point of dangerous confrontation, beyond which lies the abyss of self-annihilation. Every effort must be made to shed this way of thinking and stop the tireless struggle with someone, against someone, for something, including the harvest.

We must take a sober and calm look at the world, the commander in chief said, see in it both our own interests and neighbors' interests, and take them into account.

It was on that basis, the marshal observed, that we said in the military security blueprint that the world has now entered a period of transition from confrontation to demilitarization and new international relations, to global cooperation and collaboration.

The world community's official renunciation of war as a means of attaining political goals and the willingness to build relations on the basis of dialogue, trust, and cooperation, Shaposhnikov said, are one of the principal foundations of our blueprint. We have confirmed our loyalty to earlier treaties and have assumed collective responsibility for international security.

At the same time, the commander in chief continued, it must be recognized that domestic political factors pose the main military danger to the Commonwealth: the presence of zones of armed conflicts, unsettled mutual claims by sovereign states and new national entities, property disputes between them, the uncertain status of Russian forces on other territories, the presence of unconstitutional troop formations....

All this, combined with economic, social, and ethnic instability, could lead, if the situation develops unfavorably, to a military crisis, the marshal believes. There is also the risk of a variety of conflicts occurring near the Commonwealth's external borders. Particularly as the military

potentials of some neighboring states considerably exceed their defense needs and the danger of the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction remains. How can we react to this?

The Commonwealth states say in the blueprint that they do not see military force as a way of solving any problems that may arise. The main emphasis is on political methods: activating the consultation mechanism, coordinating the positions of all the countries interested in resolving the conflict, and adopting comprehensive measures to eliminate any threats.

The Blueprint Is Essentially About Preventing War

The gist of our new blueprint, Marshal Shaposhnikov said, is that the CIS states regard the military security of the Commonwealth itself and of each of its participants as one of the chief political goals. Preventing war is seen as a very important means of attaining this goal.

The Commonwealth states decided to precisely observe the declarations on sovereignty and acts of independence and never, in any circumstances, begin hostilities against any states unless they are themselves the target of aggression or an armed attack. They confirmed their commitments to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and not to be the first to use them or other weapons of mass destruction. The CIS guarantees the inviolability of existing borders and noninterference in other states' internal affairs and intends to maintain strategic stability in the world and contribute to the strengthening of international security systems.

The Commonwealth countries intend, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said, to cooperate with other states on political and military matters, to participate in international actions that are being carried out in accordance with the UN Charter, and to keep their armed forces within the bounds of reasonable defense sufficiency.

According to the marshal, reasonable sufficiency means a state's ability in the event of aggression against it to cause unacceptable damage to the attacker and make it halt military action.

How the Blueprint Will Work

The Treaty on Collective Security signed by six CIS states (Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) forms the basis for implementation of the blueprint's provisions, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said, and much is defined in it. In order to help one another prevent or settle conflicts resulting in the violation of inalienable human rights, the CIS countries will use military observers and collective peacekeeping forces in the Commonwealth.

These forces will include units and subunits specially allocated by each state. All military structures are supervised by the Council of Heads of State and are subordinated to their own command and, operationally—in potential areas of planned combat use—to the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Command. The marshal does not rule out the possibility of creating mixed units. For example, Russian-Kazakh, Russian-Uzbek....

The blueprint lays the purely defensive foundations of the Commonwealth states' military doctrines, he said. But this does not mean that defense will be the sole method of combat action. We are also looking to methods of armed struggle corresponding to the prevailing situation and ensuring that we have the strategic initiative and defeat the aggressor, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said.

The level of development of armed forces and of their combat equipment, the CIS Joint Armed Forces commander in chief believes, must match the best armies of the world's most highly developed states in terms of equipment, professionalism, and methods of waging combat actions, while taking our problems into account. At the same time, financial and material resources must be saved and single regional commands created on the basis of existing operational formations.

Take the air defense forces as an example, he said: They were built up without regard for administrative and republic borders. Is there any sense in each country having its own system now? A fighter regiment stationed in Uzbekistan can cover the sky in Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The same goes for the network of radar stations. So in the Transcaspian area you could set up a joint "South" air defense operational system. For Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia you could have a "Caucasus" system, and so on. Agreement could be reached on who is going to be in charge of these systems.

Only Russia Can Inherit the Strategic Nuclear Forces

One acute question that has not been finally resolved is the status of the strategic nuclear forces. Marshal Shaposhnikov considers it illogical that the Russian defense minister not be involved in the military command and control of them.

In view of Army General Yu. Maksimov's resignation, he said, I have been given the job of commanding the strategic nuclear forces. This decision is probably correct, if seen in terms of the transitional period. But, the marshal said, I have to say that great clarity is required here. The Joint Armed Forces Main Command and the CIS itself are not a state. And nuclear weapons, as a most important component of the armed forces, absolutely must belong to a state. That is why, in Shaposhnikov's view, the strategic forces command must be in Russia—sole internationally recognized heir to the USSR's nuclear status.

The CIS Joint Armed Forces commander in chief is also worried about the situation regarding strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine. The Ukrainian leadership signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and declared the country a nuclear-free zone while at the same time it is creating a center for the administrative control of these forces, and some Ukrainian parliamentarians are talking about acquiring the status of "temporary nuclear power" for the republic.

You cannot be just a little bit pregnant, Marshal Shaposhnikov said. Things need to be clear. Either one or the other. And relevant decisions must be made. But we do not have that yet, and ambiguous situations hinder normal work.

FRANCE

Nuclear Test Moratorium May Be Extended

LD0311234292 Paris France-Inter Radio Network
in French 2300 GMT 3 Nov 92

[Text] France is examining the possibility of extending the moratorium on nuclear tests which was decided last spring. This was announced yesterday evening [3 November] by Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. We have suspended our nuclear test campaign this year and the Americans and then the Russians followed suit by adopting moratoriums on their tests until July 1993. This is what he said during the National Assembly debate on his ministry's budget.

Plan To Extend Nuclear Test Moratorium Viewed

PM1011170492 Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Nov 92 p14

[Jacques Isnard report: "France Considering Suspending Nuclear Tests Until July 1993"]

[Text] "We are studying the possibility" of a new moratorium on France's nuclear tests until July 1993. Confirming rumors reported by LE MONDE in its 14 October issue, French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas caused ripples on the evening of Tuesday, 3 November by improvising, in front of deputies, this announcement, which was not present in the speech he had distributed.

"The Americans and then the Russians followed us," Mr. Dumas stated, "by adopting moratoriums on their own tests until July 1993. This is a good thing." The foreign minister then invited the five nuclear powers (apart from France, they are the United States, Russia, Britain, and communist China) to embark on "joint consideration of the question of nuclear tests" at the time of the Geneva disarmament conference.

It was last April, at the time of Pierre Beregovoy's general policy statement, that the prime minister announced the head of state's decision to suspend for a year, 1992, France's campaign of nuclear explosions at the Polynesian sites of Mururoa and Fangataufa.

Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, the general staffs, and the Atomic Energy Commission, in their different ways, all registered surprise at this initiative, which the prime minister justified by stating that France intends to set an example and compel the other powers to imitate it.

Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Armed Forces chief of staff, aware of the trouble created by this moratorium in the defense community, dissociated himself, pointing out, in an unusual message to the Armed Forces, that it is a question of a political decision—which amounts to not accepting military responsibility—and that it is clear, in his view, that this step should not be prolonged beyond 1992. At the Atomic Energy Commission, the fear of a fatal delay in the modernization of the French deterrent was put forward earnestly.

In subsequent months the camp of supporters of a resumption of nuclear tests grew stronger in France. China has in effect continued its tests, admittedly at a very slow pace. With the result that the defense minister, in preparing his draft budget for 1993, opted to reserve credits for a new campaign of tests, despite the planned reduction (at the

level of 11.5 percent on average) in investments allocated for national nuclear equipment.

Attempt at Evaluation

Everything has changed since October. One after another, the Americans and then the Russians announced that they are suspending their nuclear tests until July 1993. The Chinese, for their part, have promised nothing. Only the British, who carry out their experiments at U.S. sites, grumbled, because they believe an international moratorium is prejudicial to their interests. In spite of everything, France had ceased to be isolated, and its stance was no longer unilateral.

It is this new context which explains why Mr. Dumas is able to make it known today, in the National Assembly, in an atmosphere of comparative indifference and in the context of a public opinion mobilized by the U.S. elections, that France is considering continuing to suspend its nuclear tests until next summer. In different circumstances this announcement, which points to the fact that the French nuclear arsenal no longer has the same priority, would have prompted a large-scale public debate. Nonetheless, in the general staffs and the Atomic Energy Commission it will prompt serious anxiety concerning France's capacity henceforth to implement its plan of perfecting what remains of its strategic system, namely the warheads for the new M5 missile, which are to arm the four Le Triomphant-class nuclear submarines, and the warheads for the air-to-surface missile mounted on the Rafale aircraft.

Technicians claim that there is no substitute for a full-scale test, given that laboratory simulations cannot test—in order to improve—the "stealth" of a weapon (its capacity to mislead enemy defenses), the definition of the "geometry" of the warhead (the composition of its "ingredients," in order to create a system that combines cost and efficacy), or the quality of the keys guaranteeing the system's security (with a view to an explosion on command).

At the French general staffs people are already preparing to win the government round in favor of a provisional solution, which, after July 1993, would be to make provision for at least one experiment in order to keep the Polynesia sites in a suitable condition—putting them to the test in order to "calibrate" the measuring instruments. In fact, the Americans have made it clear that in the three years following the 1993 moratorium, that is, between 1994 and 1996, they will resume their tests at a reduced level. They have British support.

For their part, the Russian military are not keen to be outdone, and to this day they have not broken off work on the islands of Novaya Zemlya, in the Barents Sea, in the Arctic Ocean, which will be operational for tests next summer.

France To Help Dismantle Russian Nuclear Arms

Agreement To Be Signed 12 Nov

AU1111125392 Paris AFP in English 1236 GMT
11 Nov 92

[By Philippe Rater]

[Text] Paris, Nov 11 (AFP)—France is to join the United States and Britain in helping dismantle 90 percent of Russia's nuclear weaponry, the defence ministry said here Wednesday [11 November].

The sources said a bilateral framework agreement would be signed here Thursday during a visit by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. Under a separate bilateral agreement, the two countries will study the possibility of destroying the fissile material left after vectors are separated from their nuclear charges.

Two methods are currently used for dealing with the fissile matter. The United States stocks it, but experts warn that is not a long-term solution.

France on the other hand has experience in burning the fissile substance in a nuclear reactor, which is an ideal way of stemming nuclear proliferation.

The joint studies with the Russians will determine whether their reactors are capable of burning off the fissile matter, ministry sources said.

Kozyrev will be signing ancillary agreements covering protection against radiation and procedures in case of accident. Two more bilateral agreements to be finalised by the end of the year deal with the supply of machine-tools for cutting up weapons and delivery of containers.

The three to four year deal worth hundreds of millions of francs was put together by teams of French experts visiting Russia over the past year.

According to Western estimates, Russia has 35,000 operational nuclear weapons. Under disarmament agreements, 22,000 are to be eliminated. The process involves separating a launcher from its nuclear warhead. Subsequent destruction of the fissile matter, if carried out, means transforming uranium or plutonium into a sort of ingot.

The weapons are both tactical and strategic, and include missiles, shells, mines and underwater grenades.

The production, and now the dismantling, of the weapons is done in 10 "forbidden" cities, where one million of their two million inhabitants are directly employed in the military and civilian nuclear industries, informed sources said.

The comparable workforce in the United States is 100,000, and the military applications sector of France's atomic energy agency has 6,000 employees.

The Russians have calculated they could dismantle 2,000 nuclear warheads a year without outside help, which would mean a gigantic task stretching over 10 to 15 years to get rid of all the arms earmarked for elimination, experts said.

Kozyrev Arrives in Paris

AU121112492 Paris AFP in English 1121 GMT
12 Nov 92

[Text] Paris, Nov 12 (AFP)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev arrived here Thursday [12 November] on a two-day visit during which he was to sign a bilateral agreement enlisting French help in dismantling 90 percent of Russia's nuclear weaponry.

Kozyrev was to sign the agreement after meeting and lunching with his French counterpart Roland Dumas.

Later in the day, the Russian minister was to call on President Francois Mitterrand.

Russian officials said the Kozyrev visit, part of regular consultations agreed under a bilateral treaty signed in February, was aimed at "giving a new impetus to the political dialogue" between the two countries.

Under the accord, France was to join the United States and Britain in helping Russia dismantle the bulk of its nuclear arsenal. According to western estimates, Russia has 35,000 operational nuclear weapons. Under disarmament agreements, 22,000 are to be eliminated.

France and Russia were to sign a separate bilateral accord to study the possibility of destroying the fissile material left after vectors are separated from their nuclear charges.

Two methods are currently used for dealing with fissile matter. The United States stocks it, but experts warn that is not a long-term solution.

France on the other hand has experience in burning the fissile substance in a nuclear reactor, which is an ideal way of stemming nuclear proliferation.

The joint studies with the Russians will determine whether their reactors are capable of burning off the fissile matter, ministry sources said.

Kozyrev was also to sign ancillary agreements covering protection against radiation and procedures in case of accident. Two more bilateral agreements to be finalised by the end of the year deal with the supply of machine-tools for cutting up weapons and delivery of containers.

UNITED KINGDOM

Major Endorses Universal Nuclear Test Ban

PM0611161592 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Nov 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Interview with British Prime Minister John Major by Aleksandr Krivopalov in London; date not given: "J. Major: 'I Impatiently Await the Meetings With Russia's President.' Britain's Prime Minister Replies to IZVESTIYA Correspondent Aleksandr Krivopalov's Questions"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Krivopalov] What is official London's position regarding the moratorium on [nuclear] tests, which has also been declared by members of the world's "nuclear club" like the United States, France, and Russia?

[Major] The nuclear deterrent forces must not be a factor of intimidation. In our view, this presupposes the implementation of a minimum test program. We wish to act in the direction of a coordinated, verifiable, and universal test ban on a sensible and permanent basis. Many people cannot imagine that the British program is in fact just the necessary minimum: Less than one test a year, which is noticeably less than the other nuclear powers' programs. Meanwhile, we have no intention of carrying new tests for as long as the moratorium declared by the United States is in effect. [passage omitted]

Defense Secretary To Rebuff Russian Call for Nuclear Arms Cuts

PM0911130392 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 7 Nov 92 p 4

[Peter Almond report: "Rifkind To Stand Firm on Nuclear Arms Talks"]

[Text] Mr Rifkind, Defence Secretary, is expected to rebuff sharply any Russian attempts to include Britain in new nuclear arms talks when Mr Yeltsin, the Russian President, arrives in London today.

Indications that the subject is high on the Russian agenda are seen in the arrival with Mr Yeltsin of Gen [General] Pavel Grachev, his youthful defence minister; in increasing Russian objections to the new Start 2 nuclear arms cuts; and by Russian officials who pointed to a hiatus of several months as President-elect Clinton establishes his administration in Washington.

Mr Boris Ivanov, of the Disarmament Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said: "This is a good chance to fill in the vacuum, to fill in issues on arms policy and bring in other countries, such as the United Kingdom."

Mr Major and Rifkind, however, are expected to tell the Russians that Britain's Trident nuclear force is non-negotiable, although British officials concede that the Start 2 talks, which envisage cuts to 2,500 or 3,000 strategic

nuclear warheads in both Russia and America, make the 400 or more British warheads statistically more relevant.

More important to Britain is the opportunity to question the Russian leaders about the growing strength of Russian military opposition to Mr Yeltsin's economic plans.

Western officials are also concerned by Mr Yeltsin's decision to stop the movement of Russian troops out of the Baltic states because of a shortage of housing for them; and by his failure to reveal more of Russia's biological warfare programme until the West told him.

American officials said there is growing military resistance to the Start 2 cuts, to the point that the Ukraine is reconsidering giving up the ballistic nuclear missiles on its territory. There is also concern that the reorganization of Russia's forces has left confusion and a lack of direction.


"We still don't have a definition of exactly what are our strategic forces," admitted Mr Ivanov at a symposium on UK-Russian defence cooperation in London last week. "Yes, there is a certain confusion on some of the issues. There are some grounds for you to be worried."

Mr Ian Bond, head of NATO section at the security policy department at the Foreign Office, said there was concern about the reliability of military officers at the centre of the Russian government, and about "leakages" of weapons to other groups and other countries.

But Britain believes it is essential to help Mr Yeltsin's reforms because the alternatives—disintegration or an expansionist or chauvinist regime—would be worse.

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

22161



2

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.